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EGALITARIANISM AND THE WARREN COURTt
Philip B. Kurland*

As late as 1966, an English philosopher could say that the word
f i "equality," unlike the words "freedom," "liberty," and "justice," was not a "value word" but only a descriptive one.1 He was
not denigrating the term or the concept. He was saying that "when
people talk about equality in a political or moral context what they
really mean to talk about is some closely evaluative concept, such
as impartiality or justice."2 What may have been true in England
in 1966 was only partially true in the United States. While the word
"equality" may still be used here to invoke other notions, it has
now developed charisma-to use another word that became popular at the same time. Equality is the banner behind which there
have been, both literally and figuratively, many marchers. In constitutional terms, "equality" has become the first freedom. 3 It is a
goal-a value-in itself that, to many, needs little or no justification.
The difficulty, of course, is that, even if it is self-justifying, the
concept is not self-defining. A century ago, Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen ·wrote that "equality is a word so wide and vague as to be
by itself almost unmeaning ...." 4 A plethora of recent literature
on the subject confirms both Stephen's dictum and the widespread
interest that has developed in the subject. 5 These writings make it
abundantly clear that there is vast disagreement about the word's

t Copyright © 1970 by The University of Chicago. This Article was the basis
for the fourth of the Thomas M. Cooley lectures delivered at The University of
Michigan Law School on September 15-19, 1969, and will be one chapter in the
forthcoming book, Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court, to be published
in fall 1970 by The University of Chicago Press.
• Professor of Law, University of Chicago. A.B. 1942, University of Pennsylvania;
LL.B. 1944, Harvard University.-Ed.
1. J. WILSON, EQUALITY 17-18 (1966). Id. at 18:
"[E]quality" is primarily at least, a descriptive and not an evaluative term. It
may be more reasonable to suppose that equality is the corner-stone of a building
whose more obvious features are made up of other political concepts; that the
notion of equality, just because it is descriptive, is the essential point of departture of the road to liberalism.
2, Id. at 19.
S. See Kurland, "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of Government", 78 HARV. L. REY. 143 (1964).
4. LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND FRATERNITY 201 (1873).
5. See, e.g., A. GRIMES, EQUALITY IN AMERICA (1964); R. HAiuus, THE QUEST FOR
EQUALITY (1960); s. LA.KOFF, EQUALITY IN PoLmCAL PHILOSOPHY (1964); NoMOS IX:
EQUALITY ij. Pennock&: J. Chapman ed. 1967); J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (enlarged ed. 1965); J. WILSON, supra note 1.
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connotations. If it is "value free," it nevertheless engenders much excitement among both its proponents and its opponents. Indeed, the
time has come when to speak out against "equality" is to invite the
same reaction as once was evoked by condemning Prohibition.
For my purposes, I prefer to accept the suggestion made by Chief
Judge Cardozo almost fifty years ago, when a different demand for
equality was filling the air-a demand for equality of bargaining
power to combat the constitutional concept of freedom of contract.
He said then: "The same fluid and dynamic conception which underlies the modern notion of liberty, as secured to the individual
by constitutional immunity, must also underlie the cognate notion
of equality." 6 Like the due process clause, the equal protection
clause, which must bear most of the burden for translating the various notions of equality into constitutional sanctions, must be recognized as "fluid and dynamic." Certainly such a reading leads to
a broad judicial authority. At the same time, it might be noted that
the background for Cardozo's statement was provided by Coppage
v. Kansas,1 a knowledge of which might give rise to some arguments
for judicial restraint.
There are those, including some who have served on the Warren
Court, who have found justification for the contemporary egalitarianism in the origins of the Constitution. For the most part, this
attitude has been based on what Professor Alfred Kelly has appropriately termed "law office" history. 8 It was just such history, history
that asks too much justification from the past, that Justice Goldberg
was relying on both in his 1964 Madison lecture9 and in his 1964
opinion in Bell v. Maryland, 10 which read very much alike. He asserted "that equality and liberty were the 'twin themes' of the American Revolution." 11 Liberty and equality may well have been themes
struck by some of the revolutionaries, but certainly not liberty or
equality as their advocates presently conceive them. Justice Gold6. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 81-82 (1921).
7. 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (state statute forbidding an agent of any employer from
coercing, requiring, demanding, or influencing any person to enter an agreement
not to join a labor organization held to violate the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment).
8. Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 119, 122.
9. Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 205 (1964). The April
dateline on the issue of the review in which Justice Goldberg's lecture appeared is
reminiscent of the T. S. Eliot's lines: "April is the cruellest month ••• mixing Memory
and desire." The Waste Land, in COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 37 (1958).
10. 378 U.S. 226, 286 (1964). The lecture was delivered on February 11, 1964; the
opinion came down on June 22, 1964.
11. Goldberg, supra note 9, at 205.
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berg did concede that equality was not mentioned in the Constitution. But this was due, he stated, to the fact that the founders
"naturally assumed [that equality] was encompassed within the concept of liberty whose blessings they heralded in the preamble to
the Constitution and later specifically guaranteed in the due process clause of the fifth amendment.'' 12 The character of his argument was best revealed when he invoked Magna Carta as providing
one of the traditions of equality on which the American Revolution
rested. Magna Carta may have become a noble myth,13 but the notion that King John and the barons were concerned about their
equality with the people would be difficult to justify.14
Of course, there is evidence that some kinds of equality were
sought to be achieved at Philadelphia in 1787, and, as Goldberg
noted, some are in fact stated in the Constitution. He found solace,
for example, in the privileges and immunities clause of article IV,
which equated citizens of one state with citizens of the other states.
But as to who were citizens, the Constitution was silent. Even the
privileges and immunities provided, to the extent they were defined,
seem trivial when compared with the egalitarian aspirations of today.15 Goldberg also referred to article IV's guarantee of a republican form of government. But he did not talk about the limited
franchise then available in most jurisdictions, the structure of the
upper houses of the state legislatures, or of the elitist character of
the United States Senate.
One can find forms of equality everywhere, if those are what
he is looking for. At the Convention itself, Benjamin Franklin suggested that the pressure for a monarchy was based on the desire for
equality. He said that "there is a natural inclination in mankind
to Kingly Government. It sometimes relieves them of Aristocratic
domination. They had rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It
gives more of the appearance of equality among Citizens, and that
they like." 16 Indeed, the distinction between equality and the appearance of equality is an important one, as we have come to learn.
The Constitution did abolish titles of nobility, and its provision in article I, section 9, for the apportionment of direct taxes
12. Id. at 207.
13. See s. THORNE, A. DUNHAM, P. KURLAND &: I. JENNINGS, THE GREAT CHARTER
48-74 (1965).
14. The arguments about, and the ambiguities of, Magna Carta have been canvassed in J. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA (1965).
15. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
16. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 83 (rev. ed. M. Farrand
1937) [hereinafter Farrand].
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was also egalitarian in its direction. So, too, were the abolition of
bills of attainder and the ban on a religious test for office. Even the
necessary and proper clause and the supremacy clause might be construed as egalitarian, insofar as they contribute to a national uniformity of applicable rules of law.
The sticking point always comes with the recognition that the
Constitution also dealt with slavery. Justice Goldberg disposed of
that problem in this way:
In sum, then, the Constitution of the new nation, while heralding
liberty, in effect declared all men to be free and equal-except black
men, who were to be neither free nor equal. This inconsistency reflected a fundamental departure from the American creed, a departure which it took a civil war to set right.17

Which was the creed and which the aberration appears to have
been easier for Justice Goldberg to be sure of than it is for many
historians, professional as well as amateur. Nor did the Civil War
''set [it] right."
At the time of the Revolution, however much one man was the
equal of the other, it was not thought to be the role of government
to effect that equality. It was expected only that the government
would treat one man as it would another. But that meaning of
equality is a far cry from the one that the Warren Court confronted. A description of the Revolutionary scene more fitted to
the facts and less to the wish may be found in Professor John
Roche's remarks:
If one were to have the temerity to translate this portion of The
Declaration [of Independence] into operational political theory, a
different proposition would emerge-the proposition which, I submit, is basic to an understanding of the development of equality
in America over the past three centuries. It would run roughly as
follows-all those who have been admitted to membership by the
political community are equal. In other words, men achieve equality
as a function of membership in the body politic-and this membership is not an inherent right, but a privilege which the majority
accords on its own terms.
The myth of the libertarian past dies hard, but if we are going
to grasp historical reality, we must once and for all lay to rest the
notion that our forefathers built a pluralistic society around the
principles of liberty and equality.is

The phrase in the Declaration of Independence to which Pro17. Goldberg, supra note 9, at 208.
18. Equality in America: The Expansion of a Concept, 43 N.C. L. R.Ev. 249, 251-52
(1965).
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fessor Roche referred-that "all men are created equal"-has been
the keystone on which the myth has been built by the Justices of
the Warren Court, both on and off the bench.19 But the phrase
took hold, so far as I know, only orice in the early history of this
country: in the 1783 Massachusetts case of Quock Walker v. Nathaniel ]ennings,20 the opinion in which did not see the light of
day until 1874. Furthermore, the Declaration's assertion of the
equal rights of all men referred only to their rights "to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness," and it is doubtful that it encompassed any more. In any event, this happy phrase-"all men are created equal"-saw no consequence in the Constitution.21
It is far easier to accept the proposition that the founders contemplated an open society than it is to argue that they anticipated
a classless one. Pinckney certainly spoke for an open society at the
Convention when he said:
The people of the U. States are perhaps the most singular of any
we are acquainted with. Among them there are fewer distinctions
of fortune & less of rank, than among the inhabitants of any other
nation. Every freeman has a right to the same protection & security;
and a very moderate share of property entitles them to the possession
of all the honors and privileges the public can bestow: hence arises
a greater equality, than is to be found among the people of any
other country, and an equality which is more likely to continue-I
say this equality is likely to continue, because in a new Country,
possessing immense tracts of uncultivated lands, where every temptation is offered to emigration & where industry must be rewarded
with competency, there will be few poor, and few dependent-Every
member of the Society almost, will enjoy an equal power of arriving
at the supreme offices & consequently of directing the strength &
sentiments of the whole Community. None will be excluded by
birth, & few by fortune, from voting for proper persons to fill the
offices of Government-the whole community will enjoy in the fullest
sense that kind of political liberty which consists in the power the
members of the State reserve to themselves, of arriving at the public
offices, or at least, of having votes in the nomination of those who fill
them.22
This was the attitude of one whom Professor Morgenthau has
labeled an outstanding egalitarian of his time.23 There is some evidence, however, of a similar attitude in the expressed views of Alex19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See notes 9-10 supra.
See DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HtsrOllY 110 (8th ed. H. Commager 1968).
St:e c. BECKEll, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDEN<:2 234 (reprint ed. 1942).
1 Farrand, supra note 16, at 398.
St:e H. MOllGENTHAU, THE PUIU'OS!!: OF AMERICAN POLITICS 11-18 (1960).
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antler Hamilton, who hardly can be characterized in the same way.
For example, as Professor Rossiter has pointed out:
Article II, section 1 of [Hamilton's] draft constitution placed the
vote for members of the House in "the free male citizens and inhabitants of the several States comprehended in the Union, all of
whom, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards shall be entitled
to an equal vote." Other articles set a modest property qualification
for voters in senatorial and presidential elections, and this may be
an accurate measure of how far Hamilton was prepared to go in
making popular government truly popular. "While he welcomed some
political democracy in his ideal polity, he certainly did not want it to
take command.24

If the Warren Court's egalitarian bent cannot find specific justification in the language or history of the Constitution as originally framed, it is equally bereft of assistance from the history and
purpose of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the place at which the doctrine of equality specifically entered constitutional language.. Again, however, the Warren Court
preferred to indulge its liking for rewriting history. In Brown v.
Board of Education,25 the unanimous Court took solace in the ambiguity of the amendment's history. Since that time, however, a
divided Court has purported to resolve contemporary problems by
finding words here and there in congressional debates and reports
or in polemical writings of that time and this. 26
There are few things in the history of the equal protection
clause that are clear. One is that it was aimed at the destruction of
the Black Codes of the South. A second is that it, along with other
provisions of the fourteenth amendment, was intended to protect
the terms of the 1866 Civil Rights Act against judicial invalidation
and legislative repeal. How far beyond legislative and administrative discrimination which is openly based on race the amendment
was intended to go cannot be told from the language or spirit of
24. C. ROSSITER, .Al.ExANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION 158-59 (1964). Pinckney
had also proposed a property requirement for office holders-not less than $50,000 for
legislators and judges and not less than $100,000 for the executive. 2 Farrand, supra
note 16, at 248. This proposal may have been foresighted, but it was hardly egalitarian.
25. 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954). See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1955).
26. See, e.g., Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 SuP. CT. REv. IOI;
Paulsen, The Sit-In Cases of 1961: "But Answer Came There None", 1964 SuP. CT.
REv. 137; Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" To Vote, and the
Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. REv. 33; Kelly, supra note
8, at 142-49; Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal
Protection, 1967 SUP. CT. REv. 39. The relevant cases and the vast literature on the
subject may be garnered from the footnotes in these articles.
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the times. Nor is the intended scope of the 1866 Act clear from the
legislative history either of the Act or of the amendment.27 But, as
Dean Francis Allen has stated in his summary of the role of the
fourteenth amendment,
the great moral imperatives of due process and equal protection
could not be confined to their historical understandings when applied to the emerging issues of modern American life. There is
evidence that those who drafted Section 1 intended that the meanings of these phrases should evolve and expand with the passage of
time and changes of circumstance.28

If the legislative history and the language of the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause afforded scant support to the
Warren Court's resolution of the specific -problems that came before it, little more solace could have been gained from that kind
of history in which the Court is supposed to be expert-earlier
decisions construing the clause. The prime limitation on the application of the clause-that it barred only state action-was established early29 and had not yet been rejected by the time of Warren's
accession to the bench, although it may have been seriously undermined by Shelley v. Kraemer. 80 On the other hand, the equal protection clause itself had been expanded in a direction uncalled for
by either its history or its language. In the Slaughter-House Cases,31
with a prescience that the New Yorker usually takes note of under
the rubric "The Clouded Crystal Ball," the Court expressed doubt
that "any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination
against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever
be held to come within the purview of this provision."32 It would
have been better had this focus been maintained. As it turned out,
for most of the amendment's history, Negroes were only incidentally afforded the benefits of the clause. In part, this anomaly occurred because the judicial process is not self-starting. Except in
criminal cases, it takes an interested person with adequate resources
27. See Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 SuP. Cr.
R.Ev. 89.
28. The Constitution: The Civil War Amendments: XIII-XV, in 1 D. BoORS11N,
AN AMERICAN PRIMER 165 (1966).

29. See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339 (1880); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). For the strongest argument advanced
on behalf of the abolition of the restriction, at least in race relations cases, see Black,
"State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. R.Ev. 69
(1967).
30. 334 U.S. I, 22 (1948).
31. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
32. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81.
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to initiate and carry on judicial proceedings to protect his rights.
Unlike the Chinese in California,83 Negroes as a class could not
secure their rights judicially before they had the resources to support litigation or legislation, and they could not get the resources
before they had secured their rights. But the early cases hardly indicate a certainty of much success even if they had had the opportunity to utilize the courts freely.
The nadir of protection for Negroes came in 1883, with the
invalidation of congressional legislation in the Civil Rights Cases. 84
Thereafter, although moving with all the deliberate speed of a
glacier, the Court proceeded in the right direction. From the beginning, the Court, with the support of Congress, was prepared to
confer on Negroes the dubious privilege of serving on juries.85 Zoning Ia--tvs providing for segregation of neighborhoods were invalidated in 1917.86 And racially restrictive covenants became unenforceable in 1948, thanks to Shelley v. Kraemer. 87
On the other hand, the Court borrowed from Massachusetts38
the "separate but equal" doctrine and applied it both to transportation facilities 39 and to education40 whence it had come. But the
doctrine had been-if I may use the word-disintegrating in both
of these areas long before the era of the Warren Court.41 Still, the
use of the equal protection clause to protect the political rights of
Negroes was essentially abortive,42 until the cases dealing with all33. The very large number of cases in which the Chinese attempted to use the
courts-often successfully-for the protection of their legal and constitutional rights is
detailed at length in H.N. Janish, The Chinese, the Courts, and the Constitution
(1969) (dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the J.S.D.
degree, on file in the library of The Law School, University of Chicago).
34. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
35. See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354
(1939); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Patton
v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Avery v.
Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
36. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60.
37. 334 U.S. 1 (unenforceable in state courts); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948)
(unenforceable in the District of Columbia). See also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953).
38. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 209 (1849). See also People ex rel. King
v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438 (1883).
39. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
40. Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899); Gong Lum v.
Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
41. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Board of
Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); cf. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373
(1946); Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
42. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903);
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898). But see Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
347 (1915) (grandfather clause invalidated).
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white primaries came before the Court.43 In sum, prior to 1954,
the equal protection clause had not been effectively used by the
Court for the protection of Negro rights, although by that year the
climate had changed and a recognition of this function was beginning to be acknowledged.
Other minorities did not fare much better under the equal protection clause even though the Chinese had successfully evoked the
classic decision of Yick Wo v. Hopkins: 44
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in its appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make
unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is . . .
within the prohibition of the Constitution.45

This case left the Court with a powerful doctrine for the restraint
of state power, but it did not say on whose behalf that doctrine
would be used. As it turned out, the doctrine was not used to protect other racial minorities, as is evidenced by the Japanese exclusion cases; 46 nor was it used to protect women47 or aliens. 48 But,
at least as to the Japanese-Americans and the aliens, the trend in
the other direction had started before 1954.49
To the extent that it performed any function, the equal protection clause was a supplementary device for protecting business activities against state exercises of police50 and taxing>1 powers. With
the ipse dixit that corporations are "persons" protected by the equal
43. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932);

cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
44. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
45. 118 U.S. at 373-74.
46. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944). See E. Ros-row, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, in
THE SoVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 193 (1962). The argument that the equal protection clause
is not applicable to the national government is effectively answered by Hurd v. Hodge,
334 U.S. 24 (1948), and by Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
47. See, e.g., Goessaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
48. See Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckenbach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915); Heim v. McCall, 239
U.S. 175 (1915); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 1!18 (1914).
49. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commn., 334
U.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
50. See, e.g., Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459
(1937): Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S.
553 (1931).
51. See, e.g., Valentine v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 299 U.S. 32 (1936); Stewart Dry
Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935); Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U.S.
535 (1934); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933); Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920);
Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910).
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protection clause,112 Chief Justice White made them the primary
beneficiaries of that provision. But essentially, the clause was only
a tail to the due process kite, as was implicit in Justice Holmes'
remark in Buck v. Bell that the equal protection clause was the
"usual last resort of constitutional arguments."113 With the decline
of substantive due process in the economic realm114 went the fall of
the equal protection clause in the same area. It is clear, then, that
prior to the Warren Court, the equal protection clause was not a
strong element in the Supreme Court's arsenal. The egalitarian
movement was not yet a part of the American Zeitgeist. But equality was beginning to cast its shadow. Its entrance on the scene at
center stage was heralded by Brown v. Board of Education. 55
It was appropriate that the resurrection of the equal protection
clause should be the result of the Negro Revolution of the 1950's
and 1960's. Indeed, in a way, Chief Justice Warren was wrong when
he suggested in Brown that the Court could not tum back the
clock. For the Court was doing exactly that. It was returning to a
recognition of the central purpose of the equal protection clauseto protect Negroes from discrimination at the hands of legislative,
administrative, and judicial bodies controlled by white majorities.
It was a return to the understanding of the Slaughter-House Cases
as to the use for which the clause was framed. What could not be
done was to treat the problems as the Court might have treated
them earlier, under different circumstances, in an essentially different society.
Certainly the central problem of equality in this country has
always concerned the Negro's right of access to American society.
This fact was recognized early by Tocqueville156 and too late by
Myrdal. 117 By 1954, the resolution of the American dilemma had
been postponed until it could be postponed no longer. If other governmental bodies did not see this necessity, at least the Supreme
Court's eyes were open.
In 1835, Tocqueville anticipated the problem with which the
52. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., ll8 U.S. 394 (1866). But m:
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 (1938) (Justice Black,
dissenting); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576-80 (1949) (Justice
Douglas, dissenting).
53. 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
54. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: .d.n Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 SUP. Cr. R.Ev. 34.
55. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
56. See text accompanying note 59 infra.
57. l G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY xli-lv (1944).
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country is now faced: "If ever America undergoes great revolutions, they will be brought about by the presence of the black race
on the soil of the United States: that is to say, they will owe their
origins, not to the equality but to the inequality of condition." 158
Earlier in his epochal work he had written:
As long as the Negro remains a slave, he may be kept in a condition not far removed from that of the brutes; but with his liberty
he cannot but acquire a degree of instruction that will enable him
to appreciate his misfortunes and to discern a remedy for them.
Moreover, there exists a singular principle of relative justice which
is firmly implanted in the human heart. Men are much more forcibly
struck by those inequalities which exist within the same class than
by those which may be noted between different classes. One can understand slavery, but how allow several millions of citizens to exist
under a load of eternal infamy and hereditary wretchedness? . . .
As soon as it is admitted that the whites and the emancipated
blacks are placed upon the same territory in the situation of two
foreign communities, it will be readily understood that there are
but two chances for the future: the Negroes and the whites must
either wholly part or wholly mingle.... I do not believe that the
white and black races will ever live in any country upon an equal
footing. But I believe the difficulty will be still greater in the United
States than elsewhere.159

It is not hard to understand why the problem was not faced before 1954. What is more difficult to comprehend is why it had to be
faced in that year. The answer is probably contained in Tocqueville's statement. Despite the emancipation, it was not until the
migration to the cities that the Negroes came face to face with the
awful realities of discrimination, for the migration brought them
close to, but not into, the community that the fourteenth amendment intended that they share. Why then was the central question
posed in terms of public education? Essentially the answer is that
that area is one of the last realms of state competence and is one,
as the Supreme Court told us in the last term of the Warren Court,
which is basic to many of the other disqualifications that are imposed on Negroes. 60
This Article deals with the Warren Court's desegregation cases
in some detail, for they form the basis of its contributions to con58. 2 A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN A.MERICA 256 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
59. 1 id. at 373. Tocqueville's doleful prediction was shared, as he remarked, by
Thomas Jefferson. Id. at 373 n.46.
60, See Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (literacy test for voting
held invalid because of prior educational deprivation). See also Gould, Racial Equality
in Jobs and Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Burger Court, 68 MICH. L. REV.
237, 254.57 (1969).
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temporary egalitarianism. At the core of this new constitutional
jurisprudence are the school desegregation cases; then come cases
that do not involve education; and the third layer is provided by
the cases concerned with national legislation dealing with this intractable problem. All of these cases demonstrate that rapid movement toward equality of the races is not attainable through the
judicial process. The Court has moved faster than society is prepared to go. This is not to denigrate the Court's efforts. The goal
is certainly closer than it would have been, and the situation is less
explosive than it might have been, without the Court's efforts. We
are, after all, dealing with problems of a social revolution, and
such problems are not the usual grist for the judicial mill.
Brown v. Board of Education opened a Pandora's box that was
about to release its contents without judicial prying. What the ensuing years were to reveal was essentially that the Court, by itself,
is incapable of effecting fundamental changes in society. Of course,
it can spark explosions. But the special problems of school integration have remained largely unchanged, with small exceptions like
Berkeley, California, and Washington, D.C.; 61 and they have done
so even though the other branches of the national government
have joined the attempt to bring about change. When counsel for
the State of South Carolina suggested to the Supreme Court that
it would take sixty to ninety years to bring public opinion around
to acquiescence in school .desegregation,62 his statement sounded
like forensic hyperbole. Today it has all the appearance of stark
reality.
The immediate result of the Brown decree was to shift the battlefield from the heights of the Supreme Court to the foxholes of
the federal district courts. 63 In 1958, the issue was back in the Supreme Court under highly explosive conditions. Cooper v. Aaron64
arose out of a conflict between good and evil in the city of Little
Rock, Arkansas. After the Brown decision, Little Rock's school
board prepared a plan for the gradual integration of its school system, although Arkansas had not been a party to the Brown litiga61. See J. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 1 (1966); U.S. COMMN.
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 1966-67, at 90-91 (1967).
62 • .ARGUMENT: THE ORAL .ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V.
BoARD OF EouCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55, at 412, 419-21 (L. Friedman ed. 1969). This
suggestion was made during the 1955 reargument of Briggs v. Elliott, which was
decided with Brown, when the Court was considering the appropriate remedy to grant
in these cases.
63. See J. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN (1961).
64. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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tion and was not subject to the Brown decree. The plan called for
the integration of the upper grades at the outset and annual additions of immediately lower grades until the entire program was
covered. Some Negro citizens of Little Rock complained in a suit
in the district court that the plan was too gradual, and they sought
a decree ordering an increased pace. The trial court declined this
relief and approved the plan,65 and its decision was affirmed by the
United States Court of Appeals. 66 At the state level, however, a
razorback governor, with the unlikely name of Orville Faubus, led
an insurrection against the Supreme Court's decision in Brown. In
1956, the Arkansas constitution was amended to call for resistance
to Brown, .and legislation was enacted by which it was hoped to
prevent desegregation. Nevertheless, the city of Little Rock, cognizant of the meaning of the Constitution's supremacy clause, proceeded with its plan.
The day before the first Negroes were to enter a previously
white high school in Little Rock, Faubus sent national-guard troops
to prevent their entrance. What had been peaceful became chaotic.
The district court ordered the integration to proceed; the national
guard prevented it. The court then entered an injunction against
any interference by Faubus and his troops. Accordingly, the national guard was withdrawn, but it was too late. The mob had been
aroused. Only the arrival of federal troops permitted the Negro
students to enter the high school. Little Rock had become an armed
camp; law and order had disappeared. On petition of the school
board, the district court granted permission to postpone the effectuation of the plan for two and one-half years. 67 The court of
appeals, however, reversed the trial court's judgment,68 and the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. 69 The
Supreme Court recognized the problems of federalism that were
involved in Brown, but it was steadfast in its adherence to its earlier position.70 Its opinion was issued with the name of every Justice
listed among its authors:
The constitutional rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed
or yielded to the violence and disorder which have followed upon
the actions of the Governor and the Legislature. As this Court said
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1956).
243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1957).
Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Ark. 1958).
257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1958).
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
358 U.S. at 19-20.
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some 41 years ago in a unanimous opm1on in a case involving
another aspect of racial segregation: "It is urged that this proposed
segregation will promote the public peace by preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is, and important as is the preservation of the
public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances
which deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution."
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81. Thus law and order are not
here to be preserved by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional rights. The record before us clearly establishes that the
growth of the Board's difficulties to a magnitude beyond its unaided
power to control is the product of state action. Those difficulties,
as counsel for the Board forthrightly conceded on oral argument in
this Court, can also be brought under control by state action.
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the
"supreme Law of the Land." In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as "the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation," declared in the
notable case of Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 177, that "It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is." This decision declared the basic principle that
the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by
this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature
of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown
case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution
makes it of binding effect on the States "anything in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Every state
legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed
by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3, "to support this Constitution." Chief Justice Taney speaking for a unanimous Court in 1859,
said that this requirement reflected the framers' "anxiety to preserve
[the Constitution] in full force, in all its powers, and to guard against
resistance to or evasion of its authority on the part of a State ...."
Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 524.
No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against
the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.
Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in saying that:
"If the legislatures of the several States may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights
acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a
solemn mockery ... ," United States v. Peters, 5 Crancl1 115, 136.
A Governor who asserts a power to nullify a federal court order is
similarly restrained. If he had such power, said Chief Justice Hughes,
in 1932, also for a unanimous Court, "it is manifest that the fiat of a
state Governor, and not the Constitution of the United States, would
be the supreme law of the land; that the restrictions of the Federal
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Constitution upon the exercise of state power would be but impotent
phrases . . . ." Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397-398.71

The Court in this case was being carried away with its own
sense of righteousness if, by the preceding paragraphs, it meant
that a decision of the Supreme Court is supreme law in the same
way that a legislative act of Congress is supreme law. The judgment
in Brown was not binding on the state of Arkansas which was not
a party to it. It was, however, binding precedent on any court before which the same question should arise. Such a court, whether
it be federal or state, would be bound to choose the declaration of
principle by the Supreme Court rather than the announced law of
the state. Here Arkansas was a party to the litigation in the United
States district court in Little Rock; and while it had the right to
appeal the case in order to secure a reversal of position by the Supreme Court, it had no right to flout the order of the lower federal
court. Thus, the "supreme law of the land" was not the Brown decision, but the order of the trial court issued in the course of that
court's duty to follow Brown. This, and this alone, is the meaning
of Peters, of Ableman, and of Sterling-the cases the Court quoted
and relied upon. 72
The state of Louisiana took a different route than Arkansas, although its goal was the same. Louisiana actually sought to invoke
the ante bellum doctrine of interposition to avoid the Supreme
Court's school desegregation efforts. The state legislature passed
three statutes. The first provided for segregation of all public
schools and the withholding of funds from any integrated school.
The second authorized the governor to close all public schools if
any one of them was integrated. The third provided for the takeover by the governor of any school board which was under a desegregation order. In a suit to enjoin the enforcement of these statutes,
a three-judge district court held them invalid.73 Pending disposition
of the case in the Supreme Court, the state sought a stay of the injunction. In denying the stay, the Court rendered a per curiam opinion
giving short shrift to the ancient arguments. 74 It exorcised quickly,
if not finally, the ghosts of the Hartford Convention and the Ken71.
72.
7ll.
74.

ll58 U.S. at 16-19.
See text accompanying note 71 supra.
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916 (E.D. La. 1960).
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., ll64 U.S. 500 (1960).
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tucky and Virginia Resolutions. Later the Supreme Court affirmed
the district court's decision without opinion.75
So far as the hard-core opposition to desegregation was con•
cerned, however, the repeated decisions of the Supreme Court were
of little avail. What Arkansas and Louisiana had failed to accomplish in the courts, Virginia tried to achieve. In Griffin v. County
School Board of Prince Edward County,76 a case involving one of
the school districts involved in the original Brown decision, the
Court was called on to review the closing of the public schools in
Prince Edward County, Virginia.77 In addition to closing the schools,
the county provided financial assistance to students attending private segregated schools. The Court held it unconstitutional for one
county to close its public schools while all the other public schools
in the state remained open. The Court was unanimous in rejecting
the tactic as unconstitutional, but it was divided as to the appro•
priate remedy. In an opinion by Justice Black, the Court said:
the record in the present case could not be clearer that Prince Edward's public schools were closed and private schools operated in
their place with state and county assistance, for one reason, and one
reason only: to ensure, through measures taken by the county and the
State, that white and colored children in Prince Edward County
would not, under any circumstances, go to the same school. Whatever
nonracial grounds might support a State's allowing a county to
abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional one,
and grounds of race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify
as constitutional.78

Justices Clark and Harlan disagreed "with the holding that the federal courts are empowered to order the reopening of the public
schools in Prince Edward County." 79 They apparently believed that
the state retained the option under the equal protection clause
either to open the Prince Edward County schools or to close all the
rest, in order to assure equality of treatment.
The Court in Griffin also indicated that its patience was at an
end: "The time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out, and that
phrase can no longer justify denying these Prince Edward County
school children their constitutional rights to an education equal to
75. Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
76. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
77. See also Louisiana Financial Assistance Commn. v. Poindexter, 389 U.S. 571
(1968); St. Helena Parish School Bd. v. Hall, 368 U.S. 515 (1962).
78. 377 U.S. at 231.
79. 377 U.S. at 234.
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that afforded by the public schools in other parts of Virginia."80
This attitude was confirmed when the Court refused to stay the
Fifth Circuit's order to all the southern states within its domain
to desegregate by the autumn of 1967.81 In the autumn of 1969,
at the end of '\Varren's tenure, the order was still uneffected, but
the Government was hopeful. 82
The last of the Warren Court's major school desegregation cases
were decided in 1968.83 At issue were the so-called "freedom of
choice" and "freedom of transfer" programs, which allowed parents to choose the school they wanted their children to attend or
permitted them to transfer the children if the children were assigned to a school not of their choice. These programs were the
last of the devious resorts of state legislatures to avoid desegregation. They certainly had not worked to accomplish desegregation. 84
In dealing with them, the Supreme Court equivocated. Justice
Brennan, in Green v. County School Board,85 i;\Trote the opinion
for a Court that was again unanimous. He suggested that the measure of the validity of a "free choice" system was the extent to which
it eliminated a "dual system" of schools within the jurisdiction:
It is incumbent upon the school board to establish that its proposed
plan promises meaningful and immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation. It is incumbent upon the district
court to weigh that claim in light of the facts at hand and in light
of any alternatives which may be shown as feasible and more
promising in their effectiveness. Where the court finds the board to
be acting in good faith and the proposed plan to have real prospects
80. 377 U.S. at 234.
81. Caddo Parish School Bd. v. United States, 386 U.S. 1001 (1967).
82. On August 25, 1969, The New York Times trumpeted: "U.S. OFFICIALS SEE
PUPIL INTEGRATION DOUBUNG IN THE SOUTH." At 1, col. I. On August 26, 1969, in a
less ebullient tone, the front page of The New York Times reported a break between
the federal government and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund "because of the Nixon
Administration's decision last week to throw its weight behind a slowdown in desegregation in Mississippi and, by implication, throughout the South." At 1, col. 7. But see
note 83 infra.
83. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 443 (1968); Monroe v. Board of Commrs., 391 U.S. 450 (1968). However, in
October 1969, the Court, under the leadership of Warren Burger, handed down what
'\Vest's Supreme Court Reporter emblazoned "The Immediate Desegregation Case,''
banning immediately dual school systems in Mississippi. Alexander v. Holmes County
Bd. of Educ., 90 Sup. Ct. 29 (1969). Although the Nixon administration vowed to
implement the Court's decision, the practical effect of the case was not salutary. See
N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
84. See U.S. CoMMN. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1966-67,
at 45-69 (1967).
85. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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for dismantling the state-imposed dual system "at the earliest practical date," then the plan may be said to provide effective relief....
We do not hold that "freedom of choice" can have no place in
such a plan. We do not hold that a "freedom-of-choice" plan might
of itself be unconstitutional, although that argument has been urged
upon us. Rather, all we decide today is that in desegregating a dual
system a plan utilizing "freedom of choice" is not an end in itself.86
Brennan went on to show in detail how the particular plan that
was the subject of review in the Green case failed to meet the
Court's standards:
The New Kent School Board's "freedom-of-choice" plan cannot
be accepted as a sufficient step to "effectuate a transition" to a
unitary system. In three years of operation not a single white child
has chosen to attend Watkins school and although 115 Negro
children enrolled in New Kent school in 1967 (up from 35 in 1965
and 111 in 1966) 85% of the Negro children in the system still
attend the all-Negro Watkins school. In other words, the school
system remains a dual system. . . . The Board must be required to
formulate a new plan and, in light of other courses which appear
open to the Board, such as zoning, fashion steps which promise
realistically to convert promptly to a system without a "white"
school and a "Negro" school, but just schools.87
The Court then held, in Raney v. Board of Education 88 and Monroe
v. Board of Commissioners, 89 that the respective "freedom of choice"
and "freedom of transfer" plans under attack did not effectively
change the "dual" systems into unitary systems and that those plans
were therefore invalid. Moreover, it ordered the district courts to
retain jurisdiction to ensure that desegregation took place immediately. 90
The Court's commitment to "disestablishmentarianism" has
been, from the beginning, confined ·to the problems arising in
states in which school segregation was compelled by law before the
Brown decisions. It has said nothing about the so-called de facto
segregation in nonsouthern communities. Yet this problem is under
vigorous attack by way of legislation,91 and sooner or later the Court
will have to pass on questions arising under that legislation and
under its administration by the Department of Health, Education,
86. 391 U.S. at 439-40.
87. 391 U.S. at 441-42.
88. 391 U.S. 443 (1968).
89. 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
90. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. at 339; Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
at 449; see Monroe v. Board of Comrors., 391 U.S. at 460.
91. Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). ,

March 1970]

Egalitarianism and the Warren Court

647

and Welfare. 92 Meanwhile, the Court seemed inclined to leave the
burden of implementing desegregation to the legislative and executive branches of the national government.93
Although the Court has long been engaged in the transfer of
power from the states to the national government, the school desegregation cases marked the first time that it used the equal protection clause so fundamentally. Never before had the knife gone so
deeply into the fabric of society as it did in those cases. Surgical
excision of a cancer is a tricky thing. It is not clear that the prognosis is favorable.
Equality as a judicial mandate is certainly not readily accomplished. Indeed, the Court's own efforts have brought about little
change. Prior to congressional action by the passage of the 1964
Civil Rights Act,94 desegregation had been minimal. Since the Civil
Rights Act, the change has been better but still not good. Clearly,
the legislature with its power over the purse, has more effective
instruments in its hands than does the Court for bringing about
the change. On the other hand, Congress is far less committed to
the metamorphosis than the Court has been. Whether any action at
the national or state levels would have been forthcoming had not
the Court taken the first step, no one will ever be able to say. Certainly Congress was not ready to act when the Court acted. The
question also remains for some whether the desegregation rule was
a better first step than an attempt at enforcement of the separatebut-equal doctrine would have been. Most "right thinking" people
believe that it was. But there are reasonable men, blacks as well
as whites, who believe that the conditions of the Negro in America
would have improved faster if concentration had been placed on
the improvement of Negro education in the black schools, that
such improved education would have soon resulted in integration
not only in the schools but throughout American life. On the other
hand, the advice that Learned Hand gave to the President of Harvard University in 1922 still sounds persuasive even in a different
context:
... I cannot agree that a limitation based upon race will in the end
92. See, e.g., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare,
Policies on Elementary and Secondary School Compliance with Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 33 Fed. Reg. 4955 (1968).
93. See, e.g., Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 924 (1964). But see note 83 supra.
94. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, codified in 5 U.S.C.
H 2204·05 (1964), 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a to h-6
(1964).
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work out any good purpose. I£ the Jew does not mix well with the
Christian, it is no answer to segregate him. Most of those qualities
which the Christian dislikes in him are, I believe, the direct result
of that very policy in the past. Both Christian and Jew are here; they
must in some way learn to live on tolerable terms, and disabilities
have never proved tolerable. It seems hardly necessary to argue that
they intensify on both sides the very feelings which they are designed
to relieve on one. If after acquaintance, the two races are irretrievably
alien, which I believe unproven, we are, it is true, in a bad case, but
even so not as bad as if we separate them on race lines. Along that
path lie only bitterness and distraction.95
The problems of segregation obviously extended far beyond
the public schools. Although the rationale of the Brown case was
limited to the field of education, the Court was soon faced with a
series of problems not resoluble in terms of the arguments made in
Brown.96 In most of these cases, including all of the early ones, the
Court took the easy way out. It struck dmvn state-imposed segregation by means of per curiam orders which failed to explain how
the carefully contained Brown opinion opened like an umbrella to
bring these other matters under its shelter. Some friends of the
Court complained about this evasion of responsibility. 97 Others,
more result-oriented, and pleased with the result, criticized the
critics.98
Whatever the propriety of the means, the Court made it clear
through a series of unexplained decisions that the separate-but-equal
notion was, indeed, dead. According to the Court, the state could
not require segregation in public auditoriums, 99 on public beaches,100
on municipal golf courses,101 in state-sponsored athletic events,102
in buses,103 or even in jails.104 The requirement of nonsegregated
courtrooms was a fortiori. 105 The failure to desegregate public
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 21 (2d ed. I. Dilliard 1953).
See cases cited in notes 99-106 infra.
See, e.g., H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, PoLmcs, AND FUNDAMENTAL I.Aw 30-31 (1961).
See, e.g., E. Rosrow, American Legal Realism and the Sense of the Profession,
in Tru; SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 3, 25-39 (1962).
99. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Schiro v. Bynum,
375 U.S. 395 (1964).
100, Mayor &: City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
101. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); New Orleans Park Assn. v.
Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958).
102. State Athletic Commn. v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959).
103. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896).
104. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
105. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
95.
96.
97.
98.
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parks by 1963 finally evoked a full-dress opinion by a unanimous
Court, but that opinion was directed solely to the issue of inordinate
delay. 106 By 1963, the Court could properly rely on the fact that
everyone knew or should have known that the result reached in
Brown-if not its reasoning-governed the right of access to publicly owned and controlled facilities. 107
The Court, however, was quickly moved into a new and even
more difficult series of problems. Like the bans in the Bill of Rights,
which are directed to actions of the national government and not
to those of its citizens, so the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is directed, by its terms, to the actions of states
themselves and not to those of their residents. This restriction
created hard issues for the Court in its attempts to solve the racial
problems of the country, because the essence of racial discrimination was social, not political. No laws were required to effectuate
segregation; it would exist without them. Jim Crow was not the
creature of state governments; state governments were the creatures
of Jim Crow. Litigation that resulted in a ban solely on state activity-even when the decrees were effective--could reach only the
surface of the problem. The Court found itself compelled more
and more to deal with the actions of individuals as though they
were subject to the limitations of the fourteenth amendment. It
made for the hardest kind of opinion writing, for it meant writing
about one thing while acting on another.
Just as the Warren Court's predecessor had given it a leg up in
the school segregation area, so too, in the area of state action, earlier Courts had started moving down the path in the direction that
the Warren Court wanted to take. By the time of the Warren Court,
it could be said that state action included not only activities carried out by governmental officials pursuant to a legislative mandate,
but actions of officials even in contravention of state law,108 actions
of private citizens carrying out state functions, 109 and at least some
actions of state courts in enforcing private agreements.U 0 Still, these
cases, like those to be decided by the Warren Court, afforded no
clear rationale for the concept of state action.
In the 1956 term, the Court was faced with the question whether
106. Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
107. See 373 U.S. at 530 n.2.
108. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
109. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946).
110. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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a private school whose trustees were members of the Board of Directors of City Trusts, an official municipal agency, would be required to desegregate. 111 The segregation had resulted not from any
decision of the Board of Directors, but because of the terms of the
trust establishing the school. The Court held that, even though no
discretion was exercised by the state to exclude Negroes, the state
could not properly be the means for effecting such discrimination.
Later, however, when the school was removed from the control of
the official agency by action of the probate court, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that desegregation was no longer required;
and the Supreme Court refused to review that decision. 112
Then, in 1961, came Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.113 A private restaurant in a municipally owned and operated
parking facility, which was built on land condemned by the state
and financed by tax-exempt bonds, refused service to a Negro. The
Negro brought suit in the state courts seeking a declaratory judgment of his right to service, but the Delaware supreme court rejected his claim on the ground that the restaurant was acting in
a "purely private capacity."114 The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed that decision and, in a rather murky opinion, held
the discrimination unconstitutional. Without isolating the factors
that transmuted the action of the restaurateur into state action,
Justice Clark, for a divided Court, held that the whole situation
amounted to state action:
By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not
only made itself a party to the refusal of service, but it has elected to
place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination. The State has so far insinuated itself into a position
of interdependence with Eagle that it must be recognized as a
joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account,
cannot be considered to have been so "purely private" as to fall
without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because readily applicable formulae may not be fashioned, the
conclusion drawn from the facts and circumstances of this record
are by no means declared as universal truths on the basis of which
every state leasing agreement is to be tested. Owing to the very
"largeness" of government, a multitude of relationships might
111. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
112. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 357 U.S. 570 (1958).
Ultimately the school was desegregated by a reinterpretation of the trust by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F .2d 120 (3d
Cir. 1968); cf. Sweet Briar Institute v. Button, 387 U.S. 423 (1967).
Ill!. 365 U.S. 715.
114. 157 A.2d 894 (Del. 1960).
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appear to some to fall within the Amendment's embrace, but that it
must be remembered, can be determined only in the framework of
the peculiar facts or circumstances present. Therefore respondents'
prophecy of nigh universal application of a constitutional precept
so peculiarly dependent for its invocation on appropriate facts fails
to take into account "differences in circumstances [which] beget appropriate differences in law," Whitney v. State Tax Gomm'n, 309
U.S. 530, 542. Specifically defining the limits of our inquiry, what we
hold today is that when a State leases public property in the manner
and for the purpose shown to have been the case here, the prescriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment must be complied with by the
lessee as certainly as though they were binding covenants written
into the agreement itself.115

The Court's opinion in Burton is pregnant with possibilities for a
broad expansion of the state action doctrine. But its concluding
language made it unlikely that the case would spawn anything but
further litigation.
At the following term of the Court, however, a case was disposed
of on the authority of Burton, although the only analogous factor
was that the restaurant was leased from a municipal facility. In
Turner v. Memphis,11 6 the appellant had not been refused service
but had been offered segregated service. The result was, appropriately, the same. What was surprising was that the divided Burton Court had turned into a unanimous Court in disposing of the
Turner case. This change could hardly be explained by the fact
that the restaurant was located within a municipal facility, because
that situation existed in both cases; but it might be explained by
the fact that the restaurant in Turner was under compulsion to
desegregate because of its airport location, a factor the Court did not
mention.
The increasingly active nature of the Negro Revolution brought
the Court more difficult problems in a series of "sit-in cases" in
the 1962 term. In those cases, Negroes who had "sat in" at lunch
counters and restaurants that had refused to serve them and had
ordered them to leave had been convicted of criminal trespass
under state laws. Here the restaurants were not located in state
buildings or on state property: But while the earlier cases had involved relief sought by the persons discriminated against, in these
cases it was the discriminating party who invoked the law that
resulted in the criminal convictions.
115. !165 U.S. at 725-26.
ll6. !169 U.S. !150 (1962),
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In Peterson v. City of Greenville,117 ten Negroes had refused
to leave a lunch counter at an S. H. Kress store after service had
been refused to them and the manager had ordered them to go.
The manager called the police who arrested the Negroes for
criminal trespass, and the Negroes were convicted. The manager
said that he had ordered them to leave solely because they were
Negroes; no other objection to their presence was offered. An
ordinance of Greenville made it illegal to serve "white persons
and colored persons in the same room [except] where separate
facilities are furnished." 118 The Supreme Court's opinion, written
by Chief Justice Warren for all the members of the Court except
Harlan, upset the convictions entirely on the basis of the unconstitutionality of the ordinance. The Court conceded that the fourteenth amendment did not inhibit private conduct, but it stated
that the restaurant's action in this case could not be considered
private conduct:
It cannot be denied that here the City of Greenville, an agency of
the State, has provided by its ordinance that the decision as to
whether a restaurant facility is to be operated on a desegregated
basis is to be reserved to it. When the State has commanded a particular result, it has saved to itself the power to determine that result
and thereby "to a significant extent" has become "involved" in it,
and, in fact, has removed the decision from the sphere of private
choice. It has thus effectively determined that a person owning,
managing or controlling an eating place is left with no choice of his
own but must segregate his white and Negro patrons. The Kress
management, in deciding to exclude Negroes, did precisely what
the city law required.119

The decision in Lombard v. Louisiana,120 decided the same day,
was more difficult to reach. In that case, the defendants were convicted under the state "criminal mischief" statute for refusing to
leave a lunch counter after being requested to do so. The Court,
again speaking through Chief Justice Warren, managed to discover
what it considered an equivalent of the ordinance in Peterson in
proclamations issued by the mayor and chief of police to the effect
that they would not condone sit-ins and would enforce the law
against those who engaged in the practice:
A State, or a city, may act as authoritatively through its executive
117.
118.
246-47.
119.
120.

373 U.S. 244 (1963).
Code of Greenville § 31-8 (1953), as amended (1958), quoted in 373 U.S. at
373 U.S. at 247-48.
373 U.S. 267 (1963).
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as through its legislative body.... As we interpret the New Orleans
city officials' statements, they here determined that the city would
not permit Negroes to seek desegregated service in restaurants.
Consequently, the city must be treated exactly as if it had an
ordinance prohibiting such conduct.121
Justice Douglas, who joined Warren's opinion, was prepared to
expand the state action doctrine considerably further. He would
have found that any use of the state's judiciary to enforce private
discrimination-at least in a place of public accommodations-was
a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Moreover, he would
have ruled that
[t]his restaurant is . . . an instrumentality of the State since the
State charges it with duties to the public and supervises its performance. The State's interest in and activity with regard to its
restaurants extends far beyond any mere income-producing licensing
requirement.122
Justice Harlan's separate opinion set forth the basis for his
concern and for his unwillingness to join the opinions offered by
the majority of the Court:
Underlying the cases involving an alleged denial of equal protection
by ostensibly private action is a clash of competing constitutional
claims of a high order: liberty and equality. Freedom of the individual to choose his associates or his neighbors, to use and dispose
of his property as he sees fit, to be irrational, arbitrary, capricious,
even unjust in his personal relations are things all entitled to a large
measure of protection from governmental interference. This liberty
would be overridden, in the name of equality, if the strictures of
the Amendment were applied to governmental and private action
without distinction. Also inherent in the concept of state action are
values of federalism, a recognition that there are areas of private
rights upon which federal power should not lay a heavy hand and
which should properly be left to the more precise instruments of
local authority,123
Harlan did not disagree, hardly anyone could, with the rationale of
the Court in these cases, which was simply that state action encompassed action taken by individuals under the compulsion of state
law. His concern came over the question whether there was such
compulsion in the particular case. He agreed that there was in
Peterson, but he felt that there was not in Lombard.
121. 373 U.S. at 273.
122. 373 U.S. at 282-83.
123. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1963) (concurring in Peterson,
dissenting in Lombard).

654

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:629

The problem of a lack of the traditional type of state action
appeared on the Court's doorstep again in the 1963 term. The
issue, phrased as narrowly as possible, was "whether the Fourteenth
Amendment provides the Negro with a self-executing federal right
to equal treatment by the proprietors of private establishments
catering to all the public except Negroes."124 Again the Court
managed to evade the troublesome question, as it disposed of a
series of cases on one ground or other that found state action elsewhere than in the judicial enforcement of the trespass laws. In
Robinson v. Florida, 125 for example, the Court found that health
regulations caused such burdens to desegregated restaurants that
they, in effect, compelled the proprietors to exclude Negroes. In
fact, however, the evidence in the case that the health regulations
had anything to do with the segregation was no more than fanciful.
In another case, the Court reversed the defendants' convictions on
the equally ephemeral grounds that the defendants did not have
adequate notice that they were breaking the law. 126 In a third case,
the Supreme Court found the evidence insufficient to support the
conviction, despite the state court's decisions to the contrary. 127 In
still another decision, the Court pinned the responsibility for the
exclusion on the state because the amusement park employee who
issued the eviction notice was a deputy sheriff. 128 The opinions in
these cases were not convincing of anything except the Court's
patent desire to avoid deciding the troublesome question of the
scope of state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
Any broadening of the state action concept to include the action of
restaurant and amusement park proprietors would, as Harlan had
suggested, have impinged on individual freedom of association. On
the other hand, to permit the conviction of these peaceful demonstrators to stand would have caused the Court's collective gorge
to rise.
The principal case on this issue during the 1963 term, Bell v.
Maryland, 129 looked like a four-square confrontation. But that
anticipation underestimated the Court's capacity for evasion. In
Bell, twelve Negro students had been convicted under the state's
criminal trespass laws for engaging in a restaurant sit-in. They
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 101.
378 U.S. 153 (1964-).
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 34-7 (1964).
Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964).
Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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unsuccessfully challenged their convictions on both due process and
equal protection grounds through the courts of Maryland. Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, did not "reach the questions that
have been argued under the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." 130 Avoidance of the questions was based on the fact that, subsequent to the time at which
the convictions were affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals,
both a city ordinance and a state statute had been passed making it
illegal to discriminate against Negroes in restaurants in the city and
the state. It took some very fancy construction to read Maryland law
as providing that a conviction which was affirmed by the highest
state court was subject to attack on the ground that it was inconsistent with a subsequently enacted public-accommodations law.
But the Supreme Court did not itself undertake to rewrite Maryland
law. It sent the case back to the Maryland courts with a blueprint
for doing so.
Although the majority opinion in Bell was supported by six
members of the Court-the Chief Justice, Douglas, Clark, Brennan,
Stewart, and Goldberg-several Justices spoke out on the substantive
constitutional issues in their own separate opinions. Douglas, as
he had earlier, was prepared to go as far as was necessary to inhibit
discrimination in places of public accommodation. He was eager
to do so especially because this important issue was not being faced
by the legislative branch:
\Ve have in this case a question that is basic to our way of life and
fundamental in our constitutional scheme. No question preoccupies
the country more than this one; it is plainly justiciable; it presses
for a decision one way or another; we should resolve it. The people
should know that when filibusters occupy other forums, when oppressions are great, when the clash of authority between the individual and the State is severe, they can still get justice in the courts.
vVhen we default, as we do today, the prestige of law in the life of
the Nation is weakened. 1:i 1

The demands of justice were equally clear to Douglas. He would
have utilized the equal protection clause to put "all restaurants ...
on an equal £ooting" 132 by making the state compel all of them
to serve Negroes. What the state of Maryland did by legislative
action, Douglas was prepared to have the Court do by constitutional
compulsion. There is no conflict, he asserted, between the right
130. 378 U.S. at 228.
131. 378 U.S. at 244-45.
!82. 378 U.S. at 246,
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of the Negro to service and the personal preference of the restaurant
owner not to serve him, because many, if not most, restaurants are
owned by corporations: "Here, as in most of the sit-in cases before
us, the refusal of service did not reflect 'personal prejudices' but
business reasons. . . . The truth is, I think, that the corporate
interest is in making money, not in protecting 'personal prejudices.' " 133 But even if the choice were between the personal
prejudices of the storekeeper and the right of the Negro to service,
the answer in Douglas' view should be the same. As President
Johnson said in his State of the Union Message on January 8,
1964, "[s]urely [Negroes and whites] can work and eat and travel
side by side in their own country." 134 Such rights are, for Douglas,
federally created rights of citizenship that must be enforced: "Seldom have modern cases . . . so exalted property in suppression of
individual rights.''136 "Apartheid"-a word Douglas reiteratedis barred by the common law and must not "be given constitutional
sanction in the restaurant field.'' 136 There was, for Douglas, no
problem concerning the existence of state action. Convictions for
trespass, he stated, clearly fall within the ban of Shelley v. Kraemer: 137
"Why should we refuse to let state courts enforce apartheid in residential areas of our cities but let state courts enforce apartheid in
restaurants? If a court decree is state action in one case, it is in the
other. Property rights, so heavily underscored, are equally involved
in each case." 138 To reject this theory, the Justice suggested, is to
enhance the power of corporate management to a greater degree
than ever before: "Affirmance would make corporate management
the arbiter of one of the deepest conflicts in our society ... .'' 130
According to Douglas, most corporations are already suffering the
results of absentee management. When "the corporation is little
more than a veil for a man and wife or brother and brother . . .
disregarding the corporate entity often is the instrument for achieving a just result. But the relegation of a Negro customer to secondclass citizenship is not just. Nor is fastening apartheid on America
a worthy occasion for tearing aside the corporate veil.''140
Justice Goldberg, always a joiner, joined Douglas' opinion as
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

378 U.S. at 246 (footnote omitted).
Quoted in 378 U.S. at 247.
378 U.S. at 253.
378 U.S. at 254.
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
378 U.S. at 259.
378 U.S. at 264.
378 U.S. at 271.

March 1970]

Egalitarianism and the Warren Court

657

well as Brennan's. But he also proceeded to write one of his own
in which he was joined by Douglas and the Chief Justice. Goldberg
found the answer to the problem as much in the aura of the Constitution as in its words and its history. His novel argument was that
the Civil Rights Cases141 should be read as sustaining the conclusion
that he and Douglas offered, since in those cases Justice Bradley had
premised the Court's position on the assumption that "[i]nnkeepers
and public carriers, by the laws of all the States, so far as we are
aware, are bound to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper
accommodations to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith
apply for them." 142 Goldberg obviously believed that, where this
is untrue, as it is with regard to restaurants in most states, the
Civil Rights Cases should be stood on their heads. In any event, he
told us, John Marshall Harlan I, was right, and Bradley was ·wrong.
There can be no recognized conflict, Goldberg continued, between
the rights of Negroes to enjoy public accommodations and the rights
of the owners to exclude Negroes. The owners have no such rights.
In Goldberg's view, the Constitution commands that the state
compel the owner to serve the Negro; it certainly cannot aid the
owner in his refusal to do so by permitting him to invoke the state
trespass laws. Indeed, Goldberg implied, if the owner resorts to
self-help to remove the unwanted visitors from the premises, it is
he and not the patron who should be subjected to the sanction of
the laws. In the context of such a case, then, the constitutional right
of privacy, which Goldberg was later to embrace with vigor,143 was
nowhere to be found:
[Certainly there are] rights pertaining to privacy and private association ... themselves constitutionally protected liberties.
We deal here, however, with a claim of equal access to public
accommodations. This is not a claim which significantly impinges
upon personal associational interests; nor is it a claim infringing
upon the control of private property not dedicated to public use. A
judicial ruling on this claim inevitably involves the liberties and
freedoms both of the restaurant proprietor and of the Negro citizen.
. . . The history and purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment indicate,
however, that the Amendment resolves this apparent conflict of
liberties in favor of the Negro's right to equal public accommodations. . .. The broad acceptance of the public in this and, in other
restaurants clearly demonstrated that the proprietor's interest in
private or unrestricted association is slight.1 4 4
141. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
142. 109 U.S. at 25.
143. See Goldberg's opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965),
in which privacy becomes a ninth amendment right.
144. 378 U.S. at 313-14.
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It came as a surprise to many that it was Justice Black who
picked up the gauntlet thrown down by Douglas, Goldberg, and
Warren. Black was joined by Harlan and White. For the senior
Justice there was no state action in Bell. Shelley v. Kraemer, Black
felt, was inapposite, for in that case, the Court properly held that
state enforcement of the covenants had the effect of denying to the
parties their federally guaranteed right to own, occupy, enjoy, and
use their property without regard to race or color. . . . ·when an
owner of property is willing to sell and a would•be purchaser is
willing to buy, then the Civil Rights Act of 1866 ... prohibits a
State, whether through its legislature, executive, or judiciary, from
preventing the sale on the grounds of the race or color of one of
the parties.145
Obviously the same situation was not present in Bell. Black's interpretation of Shelley was interesting, but was certainly not the
classic or even a persuasive one. Yet neither was the construction
given by Douglas to the same case a convincing one. The Court,
Justice Black went on, is not Congress; each has its own role to play:
This Court has done much in carrying out its solemn duty to
protect people from unlawful discrimination. And it will, of course,
continue to ~arry out this duty in the future as it has in the past.
But the Fourteenth Amendment of itself does not compel either a
black man or a white man running his own private business to
trade with anyone else against his will .... The case before us does
not involve the power of the Congress to pass a law compelling
privately owned businesses to refrain from discrimination on the
basis of race and to trade with all if they trade with any. We express
no views as to the power of Congress, acting under one or another
provision of the Constitution, to prevent racial discrimination in the
operation of privately owned businesses, nor upon any particular
form of legislation to that end.146
Thus, the judicial phase of the right to equal treatment in
places of public accommodation came to an end, with a majority
of the Court never deciding the question on the merits. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964147 became law and, for a while, took the spotlight.
The Civil Rights Act did not solve the problem of state action.
It only amended it a bit. Since the Court could work only with the
fourteenth amendment, the question which the Court faced was
whether it could impose a rule of nondiscrimination on individuals
145. 378 U.S. at 330-31.
146. 378 U.S. at 342-43.
147. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, codified in 5 U.S.C.
§§ 2204-05 (1964), 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a to h-6
(1964).
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solely because of the language and purpose of section I of that
amendment. With the new statute, however, the question became
whether Congress could impose such a rule of nondiscrimination.
Two major differences were clear. Congress was not limited to the
fourteenth amendment in seeking to eliminate discrimination; and
congressional authorization under the fourteenth amendment came
by way of section 5 as well as by reason of section I. Whether section
5 authorized action that section I did not was a question that had
not yet been answered by the Warren Court. 148
It was with inordinate haste that the Civil Rights Act was
tested in the Supreme Court. Seldom is a statute authoritatively
validated by the Court in the same year that it is enacted into law.
But that was the case with the Civil Rights Act. Section 20l(a) of
the law provides:
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section,
without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color,
religion, or national origin.149
The test cases involved a restaurant and a motel. Restaurants and
motels were declared by the statute to be public accommodations
within the meaning of the statute if their operations "affect commerce" or if they are supported by "State action." 150 Motels affect
commerce by definition. Restaurants affect commerce if they serve
or offer to serve food to interstate travelers or if "a substantial proportion of the food served" has "moved in interstate commerce. " 151
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Incorporated v. United States, 152 the
Court upheld the validity of the statute as applied to a motel because
of the "overwhelming evidence" presented to Congress that racial
discrimination in motels had an adverse effect on interstate commerce.153 Some may find the evidence less than ovenvhelming,
manufactured in some measure by federal executive officials at the
command of their superiors. But it does not take ovenvhelming
evidence to justify congressional findings of fact. Thus, the Court
rested on the commerce clause rather than on the fourteenth
148. See Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SuP. CT. REv. 81.
149. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1964).
150. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 20l(b), 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a(b) (1964).
151. Act of July 2, 1964-, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 20l(c), 78 Stat. 24-3, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a(c) (1964-).
152. 379 U.S. 241 (1964-).
153. 379 U.S. at 253.
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amendment to justify the federal rule of nondiscrimination in
places of public accommodation.
Katzenbach v. McClung154 involved a restaurant-Ollie's Barbecue. Again the evidence was far from "overwhelming" that "a
substantial portion of food s~rved" at Ollie's Barbecue came from
interstate commerce, or that, if it did, the portion was of such magnitude as to affect interstate commerce. But the Court dispensed
with this necessity by invoking the principles of Wickard v. Filburn.155 Ollie's interstate purchases might be insignificant, but all
barbecue stands together consume enough food through interstate
commerce as to have a serious effect. Again there were findings of
fact by Congress, dubious but desirable, that restaurants which
discriminate sell less food than would nondiscriminatory restaurants,
because interstate travel by Negroes was inhibited by discriminatory action which cut off part of the potential market. Since
people tend to eat wherever they happen to be, however, it is not
quite clear how interstate commerce would be enhanced by this
compelled nondiscrimination. To the extent that they ate at Ollie's,
they would be forsaking some other seller of the same kind of goods.
But there is no arguing by the Court with Congress when Congress
has reached conclusions that the Court admires. Indeed, the Court
itself readily acknowledged that the objective of the statute was not
really the enhancement of interstate commerce:
In framing Title II of this Act Congress was also dealing with what
it considered a moral problem. But that fact does not detract from
the overwhelming evidence of the disruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on commercial intercourse. It was this burden
which empowered Congress to enact appropriate legislation, and,
given this basis for the exercise of its power, Congress was not
restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate
commerce with which it was dealing was also deemed a moral and
social wrong.156

In any event, congressional motive is not a proper subject for
judicial scrutiny.157
The reach of the commerce clause was not extended by these
cases. The Supreme Court a score of years earlier had equated
Congress' reach with its grasp. 158 Nor were there any strong judicial
154. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
155. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
156. 379 U.S. at 257.
157. See Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft Card Burning Gau,
1968 Sup. Cr. REv. I.
158. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, !!17
U.S. 111 (1942); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946).
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precedents in the way of the Court's conclusion. The Civil Rights
Cases159 declaring unconstitutional the 1875 statute attempting to
impose integration on places of public accommodation had rested
exclusively on a lack of power under the fourteenth amendment.
Congress had not sought at that time to rest on the commerce
clause, which had not yet taken on its expansive new meaning, nor
had the Court examined the authority that might come from that
clause.
The opinions in McClung and Heart of Atlanta Motel were not
persuasive for the same reason that the earlier cases in the series
were not persuasive. The result was good, but the Court ·was not
facing the real issues, as the authors of the separate opinions made
clear. Justice Douglas "would prefer to rest on the assertion of
legislative power contained in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
.... " He believed that
[a] decision based on the Fourteenth Amendment would have a
more settling effect, making unnecessary litigation over whether a
particular restaurant or inn is within the commerce definitions of
the Act or whether a particular customer is an interstate traveler.
Under my construction, the Act would apply to all customers in all
the enumerated places of public accommodation. And that construction would put an end to all obstructionist strategies and finally
close one door on a bitter chapter in American history. 160
It is doubtful, however, that reliance on the fourteenth amendment would have been more effective than reliance on the commerce clause. The requirements for inclusion in the commerce
clause were so easily met as to be mere paper demands, What
Douglas was anxious to do was to reassert the proposition that any
judicial enforcement of discriminatory acts qualified for state action
under the rule in Shelley v. Kraemer. His position had not changed
since his opinion in Bell v. Maryland. Justice Goldberg, too, wrote
a separate opinion reasserting his notions of state action as he had
stated them in Bell v. Maryland. There were no dissenting opinions
or votes in either McClung or Heart of Atlanta Motel. Thus, the
congressional power was unanimously sustained, but there was still
no rationale for the state action concept. And the rationale remained important, for the statute by no means sought to put an
end to all discrimination based on race or color.
The Court was still not off the hook. There was a plethora of
cases of convictions under state trespass statutes that had been decided
159. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
160. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 280 (1964) (concurring opinion).
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prior to the enactment of the 1964 Act. Some of them were on their
way to the Supreme Court-indeed, some had arrived-before the
legislation was enacted. If the Court were compelled to decide these
cases without resort to the Civil Rights Act, it might have to answer
the thorny problem that it had so long evaded.
Hamm v. City of Rock Hill 161 raised just those issues. The Civil
Rights Act provides in section 203(c), that "[n]o person shall . . .
punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right
or privilege secured by section 201 . . . ." 162 Clearly, convictions
resulting from acts committed after the passage of the statute would
not be sustained. But what about the cases resulting in judgments
prior to the passage of the Act? Justice Clark, ·writing for the
majority, asserted that if these cases had arisen in the federal courts
prior to the passage of the statute, they would, under common-law
doctrine, abate by reason of the statute. He then concluded that
cases arising in state courts should be decided no differently. His
strongest argument for this conclusion was that it avoided the need
to decide a constitutional question. Justice Black dissented:
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, validly, I think, made it unlawful
for certain restaurants thereafter to refuse to serve food to colored
people because of their color. The Court now interprets the Act as a
command making it unlawful for the States to prosecute and convict
"sit-in" demonstrators who had violated valid state trespass laws
prior to passage of the federal Act. The idea that Congress has the
power to accomplish such a result has no precedent, so far as I know,
in the nearly 200 years that Congress has been in existence.
. . . The judge-made "common law rule" of construction on which
the Court relies has been applied heretofore only where there was a
repeal of one statute by another-not, as my Brother Harlan points
out, where as here a later law passed by Congress places certain
restrictions on the operation of the still valid law of a State. But
even if the old common-law rule of construction taken alone would
otherwise have abated these convictions, Congress nearly a century
ago passed a "saving" statute ... to keep courts from imputing to it
an intent to abate cases retroactively, unless such an intent was
expressly stated in the law it passed.103
There was, he stated, nothing in the legislative history to impute to
Congress an intention to abate these convictions. Justices Harlan,
Stewart, and White wrote opinions in agreement with Black's con161. 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
162. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 203(c), 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2
(1964).
163. 379 U.S. at 318-19.
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clusions. Thus, by a single vote, the definition of state action was
once again evaded.
In the 1965 term, the Court began a revival and a reinvigoration
of Reconstruction era laws. If it could not find the tools to protect
and secure Negro equality in the fourteenth amendment itself, the
Court would find them in the exercise of legislative power by Congress. If it could not find them in new congressional legislation,
it would find them in old legislation. So far as the reduction of state
authority and the enhancement of national power were concerned,
it made no difference which branch of the national government
was the instrument of change. But reliance by the Court on congressional authority left with the legislature the penultimate authority to change the legislation on which the Court was relying.
That authority, of course, was subject to the Court's ultimate power
of statutory interpretation and judicial review. 164
Two cases that were before the Court in 1965 arose out of the
attempted application of Reconstruction era laws to two lynchings
in the South-one involving the lynching of three white civil rights
workers in Mississippi, the other the lynching of a Negro civil rights
leader in Georgia. Both cases came to the Court by direct appeal
under the Criminal Appeals Act, with the consequence that the
Court was free to speculate about the facts and was not confined
to the proof on the record. The relevant statutory provisions are
found in sections 241 and 242 of title 18, which read as follows:
I£ two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or
intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right
or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or
I£ two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the
premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise
or enjoyment of any right or privilege so securedThey shall be fined not more than S5,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years or both.165

Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, or custom,
wilfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such
inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are
prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more
than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.188
164. See Burt, supra note 148.
165. 18 u.s.c. § 241 (1964).
166. 18 u.s.c. § 242 (1964).
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These sections are a potpourri of the post-Civil War acts now codified in title 18.
United States v. Price 161 was concerned with the constitutional
validity of an indictment under section 242 of three police officials
and fifteen private citizens for conspiring to interfere with and interfering with the rights of the deceased to due process of law by
murdering them. The trial court had dismissed the section 242
count of the indictment as to the individual defendants on the
ground that they were not acting under color of law. The Supreme
Court reversed this judgment in an opinion by Justice Fortas, speaking for a unanimous Court:
In the present case, according to the indictment, the brutal joint
adventure was made possible by state detention and calculated
release of the prisoners by an officer of the State. This action, clearly
attributable to the State, was part of the monstrous design described
by the indictment. State officers participated in every phase of the
alleged venture: the release from jail, the interception, assault and
murder. It was a joint activity from start to finish. Those who took
advantage of participation by state officers in accomplishment of the
foul purpose alleged must suffer the consequences of that participation. In effect, if the allegations are true, they were participants in
official lawlessness, acting in willful concert with state officers and
hence under color of law.168
The trial court had also dismissed the section 241 counts as to all
parties on the ground that "due process of law" is not a "right or
privilege secured to [an individual] by the Constitution." Once
again, the Court reversed, but this time it had to overcome the barrier of an earlier opinion which it dealt with in a forthright manner:
The argument, however, of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in
Williams I [United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951)], upon
which the District Court rests its decision, cuts beneath this. It does
not deny that the accused conduct is within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it contends that in enacting § 241, the
Congress intended to include only the rights and privileges conferred on the citizen by reason of the "substantive" powers of the
Federal Government-that is, by reason of federal power operating
directly upon the citizen and not merely by means of prohibitions of
state action.... We do not agree.
The language of§ 241 is plain and unlimited.... [I]ts language
embraces all of the rights and privileges secured to citizens by all
of the Constitution and all of the laws of the United States. There
is no indication in the language that the sweep of the section is confined to rights that are conferred or "fl.ow from" the Federal Govern167. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
168. 383 U.S. at 795.
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ment, as distinguished from those secured or confirmed or guaranteed
by the Constitution.160
Despite the plain meaning of the words, this case marked the first
time that section 241 had been so broadly construed. But the Court,
while expanding its own jurisdiction, was essentially placing a tool
within the hands of the federal executive. For prosecutorial discretion, which had made a dead letter of these sections for so many
years, would still be determinative of the use to which they would
be put. The Court, moreover, was fully conversant with the problem of federalism inherent in the case. It denied new incursions on
the state domain but nevertheless justified them:
The present application of the statutes at issue does not raise
fundamental questions of federal-state relationships. We are here
concerned ·with allegations which squarely and indisputably involve
state action in direct violation of the mandate of the Fourteenth
Amendment-that no State shall deprive any person of life or liberty
without due process of law. This is a direct, traditional concern of
the Federal Government. It is an area in which the federal interest
has existed for at least a century, and in which federal participation
has intensified as part of a renewed emphasis upon civil rights .... In
any event, the problem, being statutory and not constitutional, is
ultimately, as it was in the beginning, susceptible of congressional
disposition.170

United States v. Guest171 was a more controversial case. Nevertheless, it established, even if by indirection, the expansive powers
of Congress under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to affect
individual action which is unrelated to the state action required by
section I. In Guest, the victim had been murdered while traveling
benv-een states, and the defendants were charged with conspiracy
to effect the killing in violation of section 241. One of those violations was the deprivation of the victim's rights to equal protection
of the laws as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The Court,
speaking through Justice Stewart, ruled that the rights protected by
the equal protection clause, no less than those secured by the due
process clause, were encompassed by the statute. The difficulty with
the case, however, was that there were no state officials implicated
in the conspiracy. The problem, then, was to find state action sufficient to meet the requirements of the fourteenth amendment, for
the Court asserted that state action was necessary if there was to be
any violation of the equal protection clause:
169. 383 U.S. at 800-01.
170. 283 U.S. at 806-07.
171. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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It is a commonplace that rights under the Equal Protection
Clause itself arise only when there has been involvement of the State
or of one acting under the color of its authority. The Equal Protection Clause "does not ... add any thing to the rights which one
citizen has under the Constitution against another." . . . As MR.
JusncE DOUGLAS more recently put it, "The Fourteenth Amendment
protects the individual against state action, not against wrongs done
by individuals." ... This has been the view of the Court from the
beginning.... It remains the Court's view today.172
But the Court was capable of finding the necessary element of state
action even here:
This case, however, requires no determination of the threshold
level that state action must attain in order to create rights under the
Equal Protection Clause. This is so because, contrary to the argument
of the litigants, the indictment in fact contains an express allegation
of state involvement sufficient at least to require the denial of a
motion to dismiss. One of the means of accomplishing the object of
the conspiracy, according to the indictment, was "By causing the
arrest of Negroes by means of false reports that such Negroes had
committed criminal acts." ... The allegation of the extent of official
involvement in the present case is not clear. It may charge no more
than co-operative private and state action similar to that involved
in Bell, but it may go considerably further. For example, the allegation is broad enough to cover a charge of active connivance by agents
of the State in the making of the "false reports," or other conduct
amounting to official discrimination clearly sufficient to constitute
denial of rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause. Although
it is possible that a bill of particulars, or the proof if the case goes to
trial, would disclose no co-operative action of that kind by officials of
the State, the allegation is enough to prevent dismissal of this branch
of the indictment.1 73
Another count of the indictment accused the defendants of interfering with the deceased's "right to travel." The trial court's
dismissal of this count was also upset. The right to travel, said the
Court, is a federally created right, derivable from some unsuspected
place in the Constitution.174 According to the Court, the only limitation on the invocation of section 241 as a means for punishing
individual action in restraint of federal rights is a requirement that
there must be proof of "specific intent to interfere with the federal
right."175 Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, was the
only member of the Court who objected to the creation of the right
172.
173.
174.
175.

383
383
383
383

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
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755.
756-57.
757, 759.
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to travel as a federally created right separate and apart from the
freedom from state interference with interstate commerce. He reminded the Court that it was a criminal statute that it was construing:
Although the Court has ostensibly only "discovered" this private
right in the Constitution and then applied § 241 mechanically to
punish those who conspire to threaten it, it should be recognized
that what the Court has in effect done is to use this all-encompassing
criminal statute to fashion federal common-law· crimes, forbidden to
the federal judiciary since the 1812 decision in United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32. My Brother Douglas, dissenting in United States
v. Classic [313 U.S. 299 (1941)], noted well the dangers of the indiscriminate application of § 241: "It is not enough for us to
find in the vague penumbra of a statute some offense about which
Congress could have legislated, and then to particularize it as a
crime because it is highly offensive." 313 U.S. at 331-32.
I do not gainsay that the immunities and commerce provisions of
the Constitution leave the way open for the finding of this "private"
constitutional right, since they do not speak solely in terms of governmental action. Nevertheless, I think it wrong to sustain a criminal
indictment on such an uncertain ground. To do so subjects§ 241 to
serious challenge on the score of vagueness and serves in effect to
place this Court in the position of making criminal law under the
name of constitutional interpretation. It is difficult to subdue misgivings about the potentialities of this decision.176

The Warren Court, in particular, had been most stringent in
imposing on the state legislatures and on Congress a duty to cross
their t's and dot their i's in their statutes lest they find those statutes
struck down for vagueness. 177 That the members of the Court were
prepared to sustain a statute by construing it as broadly as they
did this one in Guest underscores the absence of an objective test
for vagueness. 178
The Guest case was important as establishing a power in the
federal courts, in addition to that in the national legislature, to
make federal crimes out of what had been, for the most part, infringements of state law. But it was also important because six
176. 383 U.S. at 773-74.
177. Cf., e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 289 U.S. 54 (1967) (loyalty oath); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (loyalty oath); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11
(1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (loyalty oath); Cramp v. Board of
Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (loyalty oath); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967)
(freedom of association); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (freedom of association);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (freedom of association); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536 (1965) (civil rights demonstration); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963) (civil rights demonstration).
178. A keen analysis of the partisan use of the void-for-vagueness doctrine may be
found in Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L
R.Ev. 67, 75-85, 98-115 (1960).
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members of the Court, in concurring opinions, established the
scope of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment as reaching beyond
the limitation of state action. Justice Clark, speaking also for
Justices Black and Fortas, said: "[I]t is, I believe, both appropriate
and necessary under the circumstances here to say that there now
can be no doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers the
Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without
state action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights." 170
The left wing of the Court-Brennan, Warren, and Douglasreiterated the proposition that section 5 authorizes Congress to act
without the restraints of the state action requirement. They had no
need to conjure up the existence of state action in this case, as
Stewart did. For them, section 5 is to the fourteenth amendment
what the necessary and proper clause is to article I.
Thus was the license issued to Congress. Whether Congress
needed the authority is another question. With the power over commerce and the power over the purse, it had tools at its command
that did not have the Achilles heel of requiring a jury from the
vicinage to find defendants guilty.
Guest, however, was not the Warren Court's last word on the
subject of state action. That bete noire raised its ugly head again in
the Court's 1966 term. Reitman v. Jl.1ulkey 180 further confounded
the confusion. California had adopted by referendum a constitutional provision that, in effect, banned all open-housing legislation,
state and local, within that state.181 The California legislature had
itself passed two open-housing statutes that were purportedly invalidated by the constitutional change. Suit was brought in the
state courts challenging the validity of the adoption of Proposition
14-the constitutional amendment-as violative of the fourteenth
amendment. The Supreme Court of California held that Proposition 14 did violate the fourteenth amendment, but the court did
not really say why. 182 The United States Supreme Court affirmed
that judgment in Reitman v. Mulkey, but it too did not really say
why. As has been stated by two staunch supporters of the Supreme
Court and the conclusion that it reached,
the Court in Reitman v. Mulkey settled for an opinion that utterly
failed to justify its decision. The principal alternatives available to
the Court-assuming a decision to affirm the California court-were
to affirm without opinion, to tackle the issue of substantive equal
179.
180.
181.
182.

383 U.S. at 762.
387 U.S. 369 (1967).
CALIF. CoNsr. art. I, § 26.
Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P .2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966).
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protection head on, or to temporize, avoiding the unavoidable by
fudging. It is not shocking that the Court chose the last path.183

By "substantive equal protection," the ·writers obviously meant an
imposition of the Court's values under the label of equal protection
-a process similar to that in which an earlier Court had engaged
under the title of substantive due process. It is a dangerous game,
but there are few who deny the Court's engagement in it. Nevertheless, the search for a rationale must continue, either in order to
afford guidance for future decision or in order to save the Court
from self-destruction. The only articulated reasoning in support of
Reitman that sounds at all persuasive was provided by Professor
Charles Black, whose personal inclinations are to eliminate the
whole state action concept as an unnecessary barrier to the eradication of racial discrimination. He offered an explanation which is
consistent with the precedents and which is far more convincing
than anything that the high courts of California or the United
States could produce:
The decision in Reitman v. 1\,Iulkey is apt to be widely misunderstood, because both those who like it, and those who do not, are
powerfully impelled to see it as holding more than it did-the former
because a broad reading could open the way to attack on many more
difficult situations in the field of housing and elsewhere, and the
latter because a broad holding is easier, in the present state of professional thought, to assail and discredit. The broader holding would
have rested on the ground that the repeal of the fair housing law was
itself the state action which denied equal protection. Further, since
the distinction between states which up to now have, and those which
up to now have not, enacted fair housing laws would seem to be unacceptable as a criterion of state obligation, it ought to follow that all
states have a duty to enact fair housing laws, and that if they do not
the discrimination thus made possible is to be seen as sanctioned by
their omission, and hence as infected with a forbidden state complicity that calls down the ban of the fourteenth amendment. State
"neutrality," the holders of this view would insist, is not possible
-or, if possible, is not a sufficient fulfillment of the "equal protection" obligation....
The rule which I would propose, then, as a basis for the Reitman
decision, is that where a racial group is in a political duel with those
who would explicitly discriminate against it as a racial group, and
where the regulatory action the racial group wants is of full and
undoubted federal constitutionality, the state may not place in the
way of the racial minority's attaining its political goal any barriers
which, within the state's political system taken as a whole, are
especially difficult of surmounting, by comparison with those barriers
183. Karst &: Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal
Protection, 1967 SUP. CT. REv. 39, 76.

670

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:629

that normally stand in the way of those who wish to use political
processes to get what they want.1B4
According to Professor Black, then, a state requirement that a
majority of all the state's voters must approve any state or local
open-housing legislation constitutes the state action that deprives
the Negro of equal protection of the laws. Most other pressure
groups do not have to meet that additional requirement on the
state level, much less on the local level. Indeed, Proposition 14 does
smack of changing the rules in the middle of the game, which no
one would regard as affording equal protection. Let none be bemused, however, by the notion that Professor Black's suggestions
would afford a precedent of narrow limits. Its consequences, if not
so great as placing an affirmative burden on the state to provide
open housing, would be felt in the destruction of many state constitutional provisions now on the books, for, as Professor Black noted
in the first paragraph quoted above, to draw a line between provisions enacted now to establish barriers to political efforts by Negroes
to secure their rights and those enacted some time ago would be
difficult to justify.
The capstone of the Supreme Court's shaky edifice was Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Company, 185 which may have the effect of the last
straw on the camel's back. It did not provide the long-sought rationale for state action, but it may have made that rationale irrelevant. The plaintiffs, a Negro man and his white wife, sought
an injunction and damages against the defendant for its refusal to
sell them a house solely on the ground of the would-be buyers'
color. The Court held that plaintiffs were entitled to the relief
sought, pursuant to a long dormant 1866 statute. It held further
that the statute itself was a proper exercise of congressional power
under the thirteenth amendment which, of course, is not entailed
with a state action clause. The potentialities of the combination of
holdings are great.
The 1866 statute, as set out in the United States Code, provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by w~ite citizens thereof, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal
property.1ss
184. Black, "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81
HARV. L. REv. 69, 73, 82 (1964). How far better Professor Black's approach is than that
taken by the Court in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (amendment to city
charter which rendered a fair-housing ordinance ineffective held denial of equal
protection).
185. 382 U.S. 409 (1968).
186. 42 u.s.c. § 1982 (1964).
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Given the historical background of the 1866 legislation, one might
readily conclude that the statute removed the legal disabilities that
had theretofore been imposed on Negroes in all parts of the country,
but especially in the South. Instead of doing so, however, the Court
derived from the statute an obligation on the part of an individual
seller not to discriminate against potential purchasers by reason
of their race. The means for achieving this worthy goal were dubious logic and abominable history, all carefully documented by
Professor Casper. 187
Perhaps the important thing with respect to the Jones case,
however, is not the poor credentials that the opinion carries, but
its potential utilization which would make unnecessary much of the
recent civil rights legislation or any further congressional action
in this sphere. Still, in terms of additional remedies, the contemporary legislation could prove important, for it calls into play the
forces of the national government to vindicate the rights granted,
whereas the 1866 statute depends on self-help by the injured party.
On the other hand, the new legislation has a narrower scope than
has the broadly drawn Reconstruction model as interpreted by the
Supreme Court. Professor Henkin has explained the Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Company potential this way:
Indeed, does not the Court's reading render superfluous the Civil
Rights Act of 1964? Title II of that Act provides that certain places
of public accommodation may not discriminate on the basis of race
in selling goods and services; the Court's construction of section 1982,
when applied to personal property, renders the title (and its limitations) superfluous. Moreover, by the Court's technique of construction, the right "to make and enforce contracts" guaranteed by the
1866 Act should prevent a restaurant or hotel management from refusing on the grounds of race to "make a contract" for service with a
Negro. Indeed, that construction should prevent any employer from
refusing "to make a contract" of employment with a Negro; and the
fair employment provisions of the 1964 Act likewise become superfluous, as does the entire struggle, since the days of the New Deal,
to enact fair employment legislation.
One should also mention the Fair Housing title of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968. The majority of the Court rightly says that it
is broader in coverage and in remedy than the 1866 statute as now
interpreted. [This clearly overlooks the exemptions contained in the
1968 Act that are not to be found in the 1866 statute.] But Congress
had made a substantial contribution towards open housing, and one
may properly ask why the Court could not resist the temptation to
find in the earlier act what, by a fair reading, no Congress ever put
there.
187. Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968
R.Ev. 89.
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The Court failed to distinguish between what meaning words will
carry and what they will not, between interpretation and perversion,
between the judicial function and that of Congress. And for the
majority to assert that it is " 'not at liberty to seek ingenious analytical instruments' ... to carve from § 1982 an exception for private
conduct" is surely disingenuous, and borders on chutzpah.188
The result of this long series of Supreme Court decisions is
that Congress is empowered, under the commerce clause, the thirteenth amendment, the fourteenth amendment, and, as will be
seen, 189 the fifteenth amendment, to legislate against either public
or private discrimination. That this result is desirable ought not be
doubted. That it is legitimate is not so easily established. More important, however, is the weaponry that the Court has placed at its
own disposal. Besides the clear mandates of the recent civil rights
legislation, there are the even broader authorizations to be garnered
from the revivified Reconstruction legislation. That earlier legislation includes not only the 1866 statute relied on in Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Company, not only the criminal sanctions justified in
Guest and Price; but also, presumably, the Civil Rights Act of
1875,190 erroneously invalidated in the Civil Rights Cases; 191 the
1870 statute,192 erroneously invalidated in United States v. Reese, 193
Hodges v. United States, 194 and James v. Bowman; 195 and the 1871
statute,196 erroneously invalidated in United States v. Harris. 197
The cases which I have detailed at some length represent, to my
mind, the very heart of the Warren Court's effort. It is on these
cases that its claim on history will ultimately depend. Even before
most of them were decided-indeed, just two years after BrownJustice Douglas coolly announced their success in one of his extracurricular efforts. In 1956, he wrote of American Negroes:
[T]heir right to equality of treatment has at last been realized.
No minority in any country has progressed so far in the same length
of time as the American Negro. Today he sits in our legislatures,
on our school boards, on many of the administrative agencies, and
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Henkin, On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REv. 63, 85-86 (1968).
See text accompanying notes 242-43 infra.
Act of March I, 1875, ch. 114, §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. 336.
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 3-4, 19, 16 Stat. 140-41, 144.
92 U.S. 214 (1876).
203 U.S. I (1906).
190 U.S. 127 (1903).
Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13.
106 U.S. 629 (1883).
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on our courts. He is present in every profession and calling; he is
an honored member of the American community.19 s
If medals were awarded for optimism, the good Justice earned his
at that time.
It is true that once segregation has been found to be violative
of the equal protection clause, the cases in which a state or local
government openly distinguished among its residents on the basis
of race presented little difficulty for decision. Invidious discrimination by governments created problems only in ascertaining the facts.
Any of these cases could have been settled by adoption of the first
Justice Harlan's famous but simple credo: "Our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens:•rno It is of the essence of the equal protection clause that certain classifications made by governments are invalid, and it would
have indeed been simple to establish the rule that any classification
based on race or color is invalid. But the Warren Court never accepted that proposition. In McLaughlin v. Florida, 200 for example,
Justice White, in striking down a criminal anticohabitation statute
that imposed higher penalties on Negro or mixed couples than on
all-white couples, stated the limits of the Court's rule:

[W]e deal here with a classification based upon the race of the participants, which must be viewed in light of the historical fact that
the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate
racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States.
This strong policy renders racial classification "constitutionally
suspect," Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 449; and subject to the
"most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
216; and "in most circumstances irrelevant" to any constitutionally
acceptable legislative purpose, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 100.201
The reference to the Japanese exclusion cases served only to underline the difference between the presumption and an inflexible rule.
There were three sets of hard problems presented to the Court
. by the Negro Revolution cases. The Court confronted two of those
problems but it avoided a third. The :first was the extent to which
the Court, solely by reason of the equal protection clause, would
inhibit individual acts of discrimination. Certainly the extension
of the state action concept was only the other side of this coin. This
was a hard problem because, like it or not, it is here that the prin198.
199.
200.
201.

W. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 19 (1956).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion).
379 U.S. 184 (1964).
379 U.S. at 191-92.
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ciple of equality comes into conflict with the principle of individual
freedom-freedom to do even those acts that we most sincerely
deplore. The second question concerned the degree to which Congress is empowered, under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment
or by other constitutional provisions, to compel individuals to
behave in a nondiscriminatory manner. Stated in other words, the
question was how far the Court would allow Congress to go in
choosing between equality on the one hand and freedom to discriminate on the other. The Court had no difficulty whatsoever in
deciding that Congress could ban discrimination in areas that it
was reluctant to take under its own control. The third problemthe unresolved one-was the extent to which a governmental body
is free to indulge in "reverse discrimination," that is, to classify by
race for the purpose of bestowing greater benefits, or imposing
lesser burdens, on a minority than on a majority. This problem
is probably the one that will have to be faced by the Warren Court's
successor as the nation tries to avoid the doleful prophecies of
Tocqueville.202
A look at the essence of the equal protection clause and its
means of fulfillment may help to clarify the "reverse discrimination" problem, if not the solutions. The purpose of the clause was
to prevent majorities from imposing on minorities by way of laws
that provide different rules for the one than for the other. The
ancient concept of equality before the 'law that underlay the Declaration of Independence also supported the equal protection clause.
If a majority is compelled to treat a minority exactly as it treats
itself, adequate protection to minority interests is ensured by the
self-interest of the majority. Justice Jackson stated this proposition
in his characteristically direct fashion in Railway Express Agency v.
New York: 203
I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal
Goverment must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate
between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation. This equality is
not merely abstract justice. The framers of the Constitution knew,
and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than
to require that the principles of law which officials would impose
on a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens
202. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra. I am again reminded of Justice
Holmes' words: "Our system of morality is a body of imperfect social generalizations
expressed in terms of emotion. To get at its truth, it is useful to omit the emotion
and ask ourselves what those generalizations are and how far they are confirmed by
fact accurately ascertained." 0. Hou.rES, CoLLEcrED LEGAL PAPERS 306 (1920).
203. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials
to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation
and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited
upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no
better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that
they be equal in operation.20 4
Once the rule is recognized as one created for the protection of
minorities, the role of the legislature with regard to the "benevolent
quota" may become clearer, so long as we are also prepared to accede
to the proposition that the legislature is the voice of the majority.
The rule of equality commanded by the equal protection clause is
binding on the courts. But, as with almost every other constitutional
right, it should be treated as waivable by knowing affirmative action.
Enactment of legislation favoring a minority may be treated as such
a waiver by the majority of its right to equal treatment. Whether
section 5 authorizes this waiver or whether some other provision of
the Constitution must be found is not a pressing question, since the
national legislature's power is now plenary except insofar as it may
violate the provisions of the Bill of Rights or other specific restraints
of the Constitution. Yet the Supreme Court has no right to compel
such waiver, and the discretion to withdraw the waiver by means of
later legislation imposing a rule of equality remains with the legislature so long as the Constitution does not restrain that discretion.
The Court is the voice of the Constitution; it is not the voice of the
majority.
If this analysis were accepted, there would be little problem with
the open question of legislative power to invoke "inverse discrimination." The thesis will not, however, support judicial or
administrative use of "inverse discrimination," since neither of those
branches-except perhaps for the President himself-is entitled to
speak for the people, and the necessary-and-proper clause makes me
doubt that even the President can speak for the citizenry. On the
other hand, even the legislature cannot waive the right of the minority to equal treatment, for by definition the legislature can enact
legislation only as a representative of the majority. There remain
problems, of course, but they are the kind of problems that the
Court must always face in applying the equal protection clause:
how do you define a majority, when is a quota beneficent, and so
on. This thesis, I submit, has been tested hundreds of times a year
by the passage of private bills affording special treatment to a minority, usually a minority of one.
204. ll36 U.S. at 112-lll.
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Professor Freund has reached the same conclusion about "beneficent quotas," but by a different route:
Suppose . . . that the question of preference is raised without
evasion. To characterize a preference as compensatory is hardly a
satisfying answer to all the complexities. . . .
But the concept of compensation does suggest some possible differentiations or gradations in the problem of preference. ,vhere
the government itself was responsible for discrimination in the past,
there is a better case for its reverse preference now. So, too, where
the preference is, so to speak, transitional, by way of preparing the
members of the group to be treated as individuals. And it is the
easier to justify a preference the less positive harm to others; easier
to justify additional attention in schooling than a competitive
preference in the job market. Moreover there is an ethical sense in
which discrimination in favor of a minority is not to be equated
with a discrimination against it.... If this is a sound moral judgment, it is relevant to the judgment of the law as well, for equal
protection of the law is at bottom the embodiment of a moral standard.205
The essential difficulty about inroads in individual freedoms is
not resolved, however, by appeal to the purpose or the morality of
the equal protection clause. The problem essentially will have to
be resolved under other provisions of the Constitution. Thus far,
the Court has treated it too cavalierly. If Congress has authority to
act by reason of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment or otherwise,
it may still do so only within the confines of stated constitutional
limitations. Clearly it cannot do so by infringing an individual's
rights to freedom of speech, to a jury trial, to due process of law
(with all its ambiguities), or to rights created by the "penumbra" of
the Bill of Rights.206 In these situations it is the Court that will have
to do the weighing, and let no one say that the Court's discretion
is not invoked when two constitutional rights come into conflict. It
might be asked that the Court do the weighing publicly and state
the reasons for its choice, however difficult such a task might be.
The invocation of absolutes is hardly responsive.
Like the cases concerned with the Negro Revolution, the reapportionment cases207 rested on the equal protection clause. But unlike
205. Freund, The Civil Rights Movement and the Frontiers of Law, in THE NEGRO
AMERICAN 366-67 (T. Parsons & K. Clark ed. 1966).
206. C. PRITCHE"IT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 686 (2d ed. 1968):
Griswold v. Connecticut [381 U.S. 479) (1965) saw the Court in a most creative
mood. It wanted to argue with a legislature, but it had no specific constitutional
provisions on which to base its argument. And so it created a constitutional
foundation for its position, just as it had done with substantive due process
three-quarters of a century earlier.
207. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633
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the racial discrimination cases, the reapportionment cases were concerned more with form than they were with substance. They represent a sterile concept of equality for the sake of equality. Given the
premises of "one man-one vote" and "one vote-one value," the
Court needed nothing more for its decision than the principle of
reductio ad absurdum. There is an element of Catch-22 in the
opinions in these cases. The Court has repeatedly said that justifiable
deviations from the arithmetical formula will be tolerated, but it
has yet to accept any justification proffered.
Yet these cases must be marked as a judicial success inasmuch as
compliance has readily occurred and the public is quiescent if not
acquiescent. Still, if there were goals to be achieved aside from the
possibly aesthetic one of seeing every electoral district containing the
same number of voters, more doubts about the Court's accomplishments might be expressed. I£ the Court's objective was the revival of
state legislatures, it has failed; state legislatures remain moribund.
I£ its objective was the transfer of power from rural to urban voters,
it has failed; the beneficiaries of the transfer have largely been the
reactionary suburbs. I£ its objective was to secure more meaningful
representation, it has failed for the simple reason that arithmetic
has no sense of community.208
The equal protection clause was not a powerful weapon of .the
Warren Court in the other major field of its effort-the reform of
criminal procedure. Aside from the jury selection cases, in which the
Court upset the selection process in every case it accepted for review,209 the equal protection clause was utilized only to support the
doctrine of Griffin v. Illinois 210 which sought to ensure equality between poor and rich in the conduct of appeals,211 including access
to appellate counsel.212 At the substantive level, the equal protection
(1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis
v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sencock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v. FortyFourth Gen. ksembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
208. See Dixon, The Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail of "One Man-One
T'ote", 1969 SUP. CT. REv. 219.
209. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (M:exicans); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356
U.S. 584 (1958); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 772 (1964); Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U.S. 545 (1967); Coleman v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 22 (1967); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404
(1967).
210. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
211. Douglas v. Green, 363 U.S. 192 (1960); Mccrary v. Indiana, 364 U.S. 277 (1960);
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963); Long v. District
Ct. of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Roberts v. La Vallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Williams
v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969).
212. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967).
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clause was the reason for holding Virginia's miscegenation law invalid.213 But attacks on criminal statutes setting higher punishments
for recidivists, 214 on the imposition of a higher sentence on retrial
than at the original trial, 215 and on the award of a new trial on the
issue of punishment but not on the question of guilt216 were all
rebuffed despite claims of violation of the equal protection clause.
In the area of economic regulations and taxation, the Court almost invariably sustained the state classifications. With regard to
taxes, the charge of invalid discrimination was generally rejected. 217
The only major tax case in which the taxpayer prevailed on grounds
of improper classification was one imposing a tax at a different rate
on domesticated foreign corporations.218 The Court sustained a regulation of the sale of eyeglasses by opticians even though that regulation was inapplicable to over-the-counter sales of ready-to-wear
glasses. 219 It held valid direct-action statutes against insurance companies220 and a state law prohibiting sales below cost even to meet
competition.221 According to the Court, Sunday closing laws do not
violate the equal protection clause222-which brings to mind Holmes'
dictum in Otis v. Parker223 in 1902: "The Sunday laws, no doubt,
would be sustained by a bench of judges, even if every one of them
thought it superstitious to make any day holy."224 A ban on "debt
adjustment" except by lawyers was also held proper.22 ;; Moreover,
California's legislation discriminating against Florida avocados was
held valid, 226 as was a full-crew law for railroad trains. 227 The single
sport was Morey v. Doud, 228 in which the Court held that Illinois
could not classify American Express along with the United States
213. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
214. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 488 (1962).
215. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
216. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
217. Walters v. St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers,
358 U.S. 522 (1959); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959).
218. WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U.S. 177 (1968).
219. Williams v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
220. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
221. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Assn., 360 U.S. 334 (1959).
222. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961);
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
223. 187 U.S. 606.
224. 187 U.S. at 609.
225. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
226. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
227. Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968).
228. 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
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Post Office and Western Union rather than with currency exchanges
in the issuance of money orders. This case can be understood only
as an expression of personal opinion by the Justices or as a requirement that categories be spelled out in descriptive terms rather than
by proper names.
The exclusion of Konigsberg from the California bar because of
his personal history was held offensive to the principles of equal
protection.229 But the exclusion of out-of-state lawyers was sustained.230 In addition, if Griffin v. Illinois stands for the proposition
that governments cannot discriminate between rich and poor, the
Court in sustaining the federal reclamation acts nevertheless held it
proper to distinguish between large landholders and small ones. 231
On the other hand, the Court held that the equal protection
clause prohibits a legal distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children for purposes of wrongful death statutes.232 It also
found that residency requirements for welfare recipients constitute
an invidious discrimination.233 But the bulk of the cases in which the
clause was used to invalidate legislation concerned the exercise of
the elective franchise. Racial designations on ballots were prohibited
by Anderson v. Martin. 234 Similarly, a law prohibiting military personnel from registering as resident voters was outlawed.23 ;; The poll
tax was invalidated in one of the Court's shakiest opinions, again
resting on distinctions between the rich and the poor. 236 Furthermore, the Court found in three cases, that access to a position on the
ballot was unduly restricted. 237 Only two challenges on equal protection grounds were not accepted in this field. A prisoner's right to
an absentee ballot while in the penitentiary was held not to be
justified by the Constitution; 238 and the power of a legislature, even
a malapportioned one, to choose a governor after none of the candidates had secured a majority of the popular vote was upheld. 239
These decisions under the equal protection clause do not, how229. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
230. Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961).
231. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
232. Glona v. American Guar. &: Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
233. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
234. 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
235. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
236. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
237. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1969);
Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
238. McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
239. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966).

680

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:629

ever, reveal the extent of the egalitarian influence on the Warren
Court's opinions. But they were more than sufficient to call forth
Professor Cox's judgment that, after the demand for racial justice
which he did not include in the egalitarian influence, "[e]galitarianism thus became the second powerful factor shaping current constitutional decisions."240 A great deal more of the Court's business
reflected this factor, for, as Professor Cox also said in a frequently
quoted remark, "[o]nee loosed the idea of Equality is not easily
cabined."241 In part this expansionism may have been due to the
amorphous nature of the substance of equality-a concept which is
not always recognized, even when it is seen. In part the expansionist
tendency of the idea of equality may have been due to its use as
rhetoric rather than as an idea. And the rhetoric is subject to use,
if not capture, by anyone on any side of the question.
Other constitutional provisions besides the equal protection
clause command equality, and the Warren Court enforced these
commands as well. The fifteenth amendment cases,242 including
Gomillion v. Lightfoot248 in which Justice Frankfurter, in spite of
himself, ignited the powder keg of reapportionment, are in this
category. The construction given the citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment makes it read as a barrier to any distinctions
between native-born and naturalized citizens,244 except, I suppose,
with regard to eligibility for the Presidency. As I have suggested at
length elsewhere, the decisions under the religion clauses of the first
amendment also compel equality. 245 The twenty-fourth amendment,
banning the condition of a poll tax for voting in federal elections,
has an egalitarian flavor that the Court adopted for its own when it
struck down Virginia's poll tax. 246 Certainly, too, the destruction of
state power and the centralization of authority in the national government are part of this trend of seeking a uniform rule to govern
240. A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT 6 (1968).
241. Id.
242. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Gaston County v. United
States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969). See Fiss, Gaston County v. United States: Fruition of the
Freezing Principle, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 379; Gould, Racial Equality in Jobs and Union&,
Collective Bargaining, and the Burger Court, 68 MICH. L. R.Ev. 237, 254-57 (1969).
243. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See Lucas, Dragon in the Thicket: A Perusal of Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 1961 SuP. CT. R.Ev. 194.
244. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
245. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Arlan's Dept. Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962); School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub.
Instruction, 377 U.S. 402 (1964); cases cited in note 222 supra; P. KURLAND, R.Er.1c10N
AND THE LAw (1962); Kurland, The Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury,
Signifying •••", 1962 SUP. CT. REV. I.
246. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
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all. Even the void-for-vagueness cases247-which I prefer to denominate the vague-for-voidness cases-are essentially in this category,
for they held in effect that the particular legislative classification in
question was overbroad. The case of Aptheker v. Secretary of State 248
rested specifically on that proposition, and most of the cases concerned with Communists and subversives are not different in their
constitutional question-that is, can these groups, as defined, be
treated differently?
What must quickly become apparent is that all governmental
processes necessarily involve the problem of classification and can be
analyzed in terms of the propriety of their classifications. They are all
subject to measurement against the demands of the equal protection
clause. And the Court seems more and more ready to address them
in just those terms. Some bases for classification are clearly forbidden
or, at least, are highly suspect because of explicit terms of the Constitution; race is one, religion is another. But for the most part the
test is the same as that which was put forth under the due process
clause: Is it reasonable for a governmental body to classify in this
way? It is not surprising that we see an appeal to the Court to engage
in the development of "substantive equal protection," for "substantive equal protection" is but another name for "substantive due
process." Each will do as well as the other as a means of limiting or
destroying nonjudicial governmental authority.
"Substantive equal protection" is not a novel concept. It was
utilized, for example, by the Taft Court in Truax v. Corrigan, 249
in which the Court held that a state law forbidding injunctions in
labor cases was violative of the equal protection clause because injunctions remained available as a form of relief in other kinds of
cases. The decision, like so many others that we have seen, was
rendered by a Court which was divided five to four. Holmes and
Brandeis were among the dissenters. Holmes, in keeping with his
judicial philosophy, said: "Legislation may begin where an evil
begins. If, as many intelligent people believe, there is more danger
that the injunction will be abused in labor cases than elsewhere I
can feel no doubt of the power of the legislature to deny it in such
cases.'' 200
I invoke the example of Truax v. Corrigan at this time for two
reasons. First, it is a reminder of the fact that what we are talking
247. See, e.g., cases cited in note 177 supra; Tussman &: tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
248. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
249. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
250. 257 U.S. at 343.
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about is the allocation of power to, and the use of power by, the
Court as an institution. As with the institution of the Presidency,
the individuals change but the power accrued by the institution
remains, until it is taken away. I do not know, but I can guess, that
those who were anxious for Warren and company to have this discretionary power will be more wary of giving it to the Nixon Court,
especially as it blossoms with new personnel.
The second reason for discussing Truax is to suggest that the
notion of equality is multifaceted. Conformity and uniformity are
also parts of equality. But even if we were to accept the egalitarian
goal as contemporarily stated, we should be wary of making it our
prime value. The modern definition, as I see it, I borrow from an
Englishman, for England too has the same forces to confront, even if
it lacks a Supreme Court with which to do it:
The more nearly the citizens of a country resemble one another
in the amount of money they spend, the goods they own, the education they acquire and the social deference they receive, the more
nearly perfect the country will be.251
Yesterday, the exponents of this doctrine urged that the Supreme
Court be the institution to determine the doctrine's applicability to
the social, economic, and political scene in the United States. Tomorrow they may regret that this power is possessed by any governmental body, including the Supreme Court. As Geoffrey Gorer
·wrote:
I£ mobilized public envy and resentment begrudge any social
deference or conspicuous success outside the power hierarchy, then
the way is being prepared for a single-value society. To the extent
that the obverse of a desire for social justice is envy of, or resentment
at, conspicuous success, rather than pity for conspicuous unsuccess,
to that extent is the striving for a just state likely to result in a
state where all power is concentrated in a single hierarchy, where
all that will remain of a democracy will be a ritual whereby members at the top of the power hierarchy will exchange political positions among themselves at irregular intervals. Democracy depends
on a multiplicity of values; if only a single value is emphasized
democracy cannot survive.2 52

Those too young to remember what happened to Europe immediately prior to World War II, as country after country fell under
the thrall of equality, may yet find the allegory of Orwell's Animal
Farm instructive and frightening.
251. G. GORER,
252. Id. at 71.
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